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ABSTRACT 
 The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) specifies an optional communities attribute 
for traffic engineering, route manipulation, remotely-triggered blackholing, and other 
services. However, communities have neither unifying semantics nor cryptographic 
protections and often propagate much farther than intended. Consequently, Autonomous 
System (AS) operators are free to define their own community values. This research is a 
proof-of-concept for a machine learning approach to prediction of community semantics; 
it attempts a quantitative measurement of semantic predictability between different AS 
semantic schemata. Ground-truth community semantics data were collated and manually 
labeled according to a unified taxonomy of community services. Various classification 
algorithms, including a feed-forward Multi-Layer Perceptron and a Random Forest, were 
used as the estimator for a One-vs-All multi-class model and trained according to a 
feature set engineered from this data. The best model’s performance on the test set 
indicates as much as 89.15% of these semantics can be accurately predicted according to 
a proposed standard taxonomy of community services. This model was additionally 
applied to historical BGP data from various route collectors to estimate the taxonomic 
distribution of communities transiting the control plane. 
v 
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The prefix reachability information communicated by BGP advertisements is critical for
the proper operation of the global internet. These advertisements make use of the optional,
transitive BGP community tags specified by the protocol for a variety of purposes includ-
ing traffic steering, route manipulation, geotagging, peer-type tagging, remotely-triggered
blackholing, and other services at the discretion of the particular Autonomous System (AS)
whence an advertisement originates and the community target for whom it is intended.
However, communities have no unifying semantic, no cryptographic protections, and often
propagate much farther than intended. Consequently, AS operators are free to define their
own community values, and the data collected in the course of this research suggests high
variability between ASes; many communities defy the proposed standard taxonomy, while
others span multiple classifications or eschew the Request for Comments (RFC) standard
and encode a commonly-defined value for a different purpose. Thus, community semantics
are shrouded in uncertainty, and recent research has demonstrated their potential as a vector
for several different types of attack.
To demystify these semantics, this research employed a machine learning approach to
prediction of community semantics; it sought to quantitatively analyze the semantic pre-
dictability between different AS semantic schemata. Ground truth community semantics
data were collated from existing datasets and web scraping of known AS semantics using
publicly available BGP community definitions. These data were manually labeled according
to a common taxonomy. As there is a distinct class imbalance between the services in the
available data, various class imbalance correction techniques were utilized on the training
data, including Adaptive Synthetic Sampling (ADASYN), Synthetic Minority Oversam-
pling (SMOTE), and Random Oversampling. Various classification algorithms, including
a feed-forward MLP and Random Forest, were used as estimators for a One-vs-All (binary
relevance) multi-class model and trained from vectors according to a feature set engineered
from this data. Of these, the Random Forest was the most successful model developed. In
all cases, hyperparameters, including layer sizing, were tuned using a grid search.
Model performance on the test set indicates varying degrees of predictability between
classes, with overall accuracy indicating as much as 90.64% of community semantics can
xvii
be accurately predicted by such a model. Additionally, this model was applied through a
Multi-Threaded Routing Toolkit (MRT) parser to recent BGP data at various vantages to
estimate the taxonomic distribution of communities transiting the control plane.
Given the uncertainty in community semantics, and their potential for misuse, this research
seeks to inform future work in detection of anomalous community usage to deter, detect,
and potentially filter community-based threats or misconfiguration events. It further seeks to
bring attention to the variability of semantic encodings between different ASes, especially
those which contradict RFC standards or span multiple classifications.
xviii
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The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the de facto standard for inter-domain routing
in the Internet today. Its primary purpose is to communicate network prefix reachability
information between Autonomous Systems (ASes). It prescribes a specific path of ASes
throughwhich trafficmay travel to reach a particular prefix. For this reason, BGP represents a
“hop-by-hop” paradigm to routing betweenASes in which the path traffic takes is dictated by
its transfer fromoneAS to the next. This routing information can be used tomap connectivity
between ASes, detect routing loops, and, crucially, to implement policy decisions [1].
Network administrators at any given AS can thus utilize BGP to dictate a consistent policy
for routing through their domain. Unfortunately, as the internet has grown and network com-
plexity has increased exponentially, routing policy requirements have become increasingly
complex and fine-grained [2], [3].
To help implement such policies and facilitate communication between ASes, BGP “com-
munities” were introduced in 1996 by Request for Comments (RFC) 1997 [4]. These com-
munities are encoded as 32-bit numbers in a variable-length attribute, allowing multiple
communities to be applied to a particular route. The original intent of BGP communities was
to “facilitate and simplify the control of routing information” [4] by grouping destinations
such that routing decisions can be applied at a group level. A community is thus a group of
destinations which share some common property, and to which a common routing policy
can be applied.
This proposal further defined well-known communities and specified a standard format
for their interpretation, to wit, that the first two octets (the most significant word) should
specify an AS number, and the last two octets (the least significant word) should specify a
community value defined by that AS. For example, AS 2914 is free to specify community
values in the range 0x0B620000 to 0x0B62FFFF, such that the first two octets always
represent 2914 (0x0B62), while the latter two octets can encode any community defined
by the network operators of AS 2914 according to any schema they devise [4]. That is to
say, AS operators are free to define a value in the last two octets—a range that contains 216
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possible values—as a signal or tag for a particular community service. This system can be
used both for active signalling and passive encoding of information [5].
This has created extreme variation in community definitions between ASes. For example,
the value 666 is used for blackholing services by AS 2914; AS 3356 defines the same value
as a route tag to indicate that the route was learned from a peer, rather than a customer [6],
[7]. Many communities are intended for internal use only, and thus their definitions are
known only to that AS’s operators. Moreover, many ASes do not publicly disclose their
community definitions except to their own customers, further shrouding the semantic space
in mystery.
The primary intent of this thesis is to pierce this mystery—to the extent possible—by
quantitatively analyzing community semantics. To this end, this research seeks to build
a predictive model capable of accurately classifying BGP communities according to an
established taxonomy of community services proposed by [8]; this taxonomy identifies the
three major categories and ten subcategories of passive and active community semantics
used among ASes. Our research seeks to understand how much of the community value
space can be identified according to this taxonomy through common features between AS-
defined schemata. It further seeks to apply the best model created to recent BGP data to
profile the taxonomic distribution of communities in the wild.
1.1 Motivation
BGP communities are of interest to the research community because they represent a
potential attack vector; identifying “anomalous” communities—caused either through mis-
configuration or malicious intent—is a challenging problem, particularly considering their
lack of unifying semantics. Additionally, communities which propagate farther than their
intended target may publicly leak information about the configuration and activities of a
particular AS. Yet, their adoption and use is increasing.
In fact, the number of ASes and prefixes has grown considerably since the introduction
of BGP communities in 1996. Either as a result of this, broader adoption of communities
generally, or some combination thereof, the number of unique communities observed at
route collectors has increased as well. Between 2010 and 2018, the number of unique
communities increased by 296% [9].
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Indeed, AS operators use BGP communities extensively to control routing policy within
their domain, and even offer value-enhancing services to their customers [3], [5]. They
offer a simple and convenient mechanism to engineer traffic, manage AS policy, and even
mitigate attacks. This includes Denial of Service (DoS) deterrence via Remotely-Triggered
Blackholing (RTBH), announcement filtering, local preference adjustments, influencing
peer selection through path prepending, selective advertisement, and tagging routes by
geographic ingress points and origins. In fact, the amount of information they signal is
increasingly used to encode other information, such as round trip times (RTTs) [5].
Consequently, AS operators configure their infrastructure to take different actions depending
on community tags [5], but these actions are implementation-dependent. Furthermore,
vendor implementations sometimes vary in the way well-known communities are processed
and manipulated, sometimes resulting in inconsistent behaviors that are difficult to identify
and resolve [10].
At the same time, the BGP lacks built-in cryptographic protections, allowing any BGP
router to announce any arbitrary route, with arbitrary community values [11]. Although
secure versions of the protocol, such as BGPsec, have been proposed, it has thus far proved
impractical to deploy due to its computational complexity. An alternate scheme of prefix
filtering has been proposed but is difficult to implement due to the difficulty in designing
effective filters [12]. To make matters worse, even these solutions offer no protections for
optional attributes such as communities [5].
Similarly, BGP often suffers from misconfiguration events, particularly origin and export
misconfiguration, which may become globally visible and contribute to global connectivity
issues [13]. Understanding the community string in such events may be of use to operators
attempting to pinpoint their cause, malicious or otherwise, and additionally aid in the
creation of intelligent filters. When communities leak in such events, or otherwise propagate
beyond their intended targets, they may also leak information about the activities and
configuration of a specific AS.
More importantly, BGP communities have been demonstrated to be a viable attack vec-
tor. According to the proposed standard, an AS should scrub inbound communities used
internally—i.e., with their AS in the first two octets—but forward any foreign communi-
ties, as these may be needed for customers to communicate with upstream providers [14].
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However, if communities propagate farther than intended, they may trigger effects multiple
hops beyond the direct peer to which they were originally announced, and there is no way
of knowing if such behavior is intended [9].
In fact, prior research has demonstrated that they are often propagated farther than a single
routing hop, at least partially due to poor understanding of their semantics. As much as
14% of transit providers propagate received communities to their peers. As the Internet’s
topology continues to flatten, this implies communities are continually being propagated
widely through the internet [5], [9].
This enables a number of attack scenarios, including manipulation of communities for ma-
licious interception of traffic, imposition of additional cost for a target AS, and impairment
(including denial of service) or improvement of network performance. This can be medi-
ated through manipulation of community services, optionally in conjunction with prefix
hijacking, that control RTBH, path prepending, and local preference [5].
To better understand how to build effective detectors for such attacks, a researcher or operator
must first be able to understand the communities an AS is propagating, particularly foreign
communities. This is the primary motivation for this thesis.
1.2 Research Questions
The primary research questions this thesis seeks to answer are:
1. Is there structure to the assigned communities values within an AS such that the
meaning of an unknown community can be accurately predicted?
2. Given that BGP community semantics are AS-specific, do their semantic schemata
present any common features or occupy similar ranges according to the guidelines
set forth by [4]? That is, is there common structure to community values between
different ASes such that the meaning of community value not previously observed for
a given AS can be accurately predicted?
3. Are there features that allow the meaning of a community value that has never been
observed in the past to be accurately predicted?
4. Can a linear or non-linear function be used as an effective estimator for the classi-
fication boundaries between the different BGP communities according to a unifying
4
taxonomy? Which technique will prove most efficacious for this purpose?
5. According to this model, assuming it can obtain reasonable accuracy, what percentage
of community attribute usage in recent BGP data is attributable to policy decisions?
What percentage is used for traffic engineering? What percentage is used for DoS
prevention?
1.3 Scope
This thesis is limited to research into the semantics of 32-bit BGP communities. While
extended and large communities have been defined, principally because many ASes now
have AS numbers greater than will fit in the most significant word of a 32-bit community,
their adoption is generally low compared to their 32-bit predecessors. This is, however,
likely to change in the future [15]. Furthermore, this research limits itself to consideration
of Internet Protocol (IP) version 4 prefixes in the context of BGP.
1.4 Summary of Major Findings
The principal findings of this research are summarized below. Chapter 4 presents these
findings in greater detail:
1. The unified taxonomy proposed by [8] is broadly applicable according to our findings,
however, its use as a classifying scheme is limited by the presence of communities
which spanmultiple categories (i.e., communities which are effectively “multi-class”)
and the fact that some communities have different meanings when applied alone or
together.
2. A small number of communities—approximately 0.25% of observed data—do not fit
into any particular subcategory of this taxonomy.
3. Many ASes use a nonstandard syntax with respect to RFC 1997 [4]; to offer specific
Outbound services to a particular AS, many ASes use the most significant word to
encode the service (e.g., the number of prepends) and the least significant word to
specify a particular AS to which that behavior should apply. This demonstrates a
fundamental limitation of the standard syntax. 118 such communities are present in
collected data.
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4. This research develops a feed-forward Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP)-based multi-
class model; although it was able to obtain high accuracy—see Chapter 4—it was not
as successful as a Random Forest-based model.
5. The most successful model developed achieves 90.64% aggregate accuracy in clas-
sifying eight subcategories of the standard taxonomy when presented with novel
testing data. Further, this model is able to categorize the principal three categories
with 97.49% accuracy. This indicates that, at least among the ASes studied, there is
enough information to predict community values that have not been seen before in
the majority of cases.
6. The prediction accuracy varies between classes, as measured by 1 score; low 1
score in a given subcategory may be due to the inherent class imbalance observed in
the data, and thus inability of the model to generalize from relatively few samples.
In particular, this affects the Inbound: AS subcategory. Inbound: Local Preference
and Blackhole were the classes with the next-lowest 1 score. It is unclear if this
indicates greater variance between ASes for specific subcategories, or if more data
would increase predictive accuracy.
7. The BGP community string is a variable-length attribute; a given route announce-
ment may contain an arbitrary number of communities in its community string. A
Cumulative Density Function (CDF) for the length of this string in recent BGP data
suggests that 83% of community strings include eight or fewer communities; however,
community strings with 30-40 communities were observed to comprise as much as
2% of communities collected at these vantages.
8. Application of the best model to recent BGP data at three route collectors as Réseaux
IP Européens (RIPE) indicates that the majority (between 94% and 98%) encode
passive signaling semantics, particularly Inbound: Geographic tags. Communities
encoding active Outbound semantics, such as path prepending and announcement
policy, were predicted to compose between 1.08% and 2.46% of data over the two
capture intervals during which BGP control packets were studied. This was an unex-
pected result, andmay indicate a period of relative stability in the global routing tables
as seen from the three vantages under study. A significant difference between capture
intervals was an increase in the proportion of Blackhole communities observed, from
0.49% to 2.04%. According to our model’s prediction of instantaneous distribution
of community semantics, this may have arisen from RTBH events.
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1.5 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis will adhere to the following outline:
1. Chapter 2 provides background information on the BGP and the common uses of the
BGP communities attribute as exemplified by the taxonomy described in [8], as well
as the prior work which fueled this research. It additionally introduces the machine
learning methods used in the creation and selection of the predictive models created
by this research, and the statistical methods in support thereof.
2. Chapter 3 explains the data collection process, the data manipulation needed for
the training set, model selection, and the verification process used. This chapter
also discusses the creation of the feature set used by the model, as well as various
limitations and extreme outliers discovered during the process.
3. Chapter 4 presents the key findings of this research, with particular regard to the
accuracy of the model as described by precision, recall, and 1 score over each
class, a confusion matrix, the accuracy of the model in aggregate, Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curves, and Precision-Recall curves broken down by class. This
chapter also presents the model’s estimation of taxonomic distribution in recent BGP
data.
4. Chapter 5 offers an analysis of the key findings of this research and discusses their
implications for the semantics of BGP communities and community-based threats.
Furthermore, it suggests future work that can build upon this research in pursuit of a
detector for anomalous community usage.
7




Routing between domains functionally enables the internet today, but our current standard,
the Border Gateway Protocol, is imperfect and thus open to abuse. This chapter will intro-
duce the foundational concepts underlying inter-domain routing generally, the role of BGP
communities in this process, and the machine learning concepts applied by this research to
study them.
2.1 The Border Gateway Protocol
The internet is composed ofmanyASes, a generic termdescribing any entity that administers
a collection of routers within a particular domain. An AS could be an Internet Service
Provider (ISP), a Content Distribution Network (CDN), an Internet Exchange Point (IXP),
a university, a research network, a factory, etc. Each AS is assigned an AS number: the
University of California, San Diego, for example, is AS 7377, while the ISP Comcast is
AS 7922 [16]. These entities apply routing policies within their domain through an Interior
Gateway Protocol (IGP) (or IGPs) and some set(s) of common metrics, and use an Exterior
Gateway Protocol (EGP) to direct traffic that must be sent to another AS [17].
The BGP is the standard EGP in use in the internet today. It provides a mechanism in
support of Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) by announcing reachability information
for networks within a domain. More specifically, an AS router, called a speaker, will
announce a set of destinations that can be reached on its domain as an IP prefix [1]. This is
the mechanism by which ASes learn how to route traffic on their networks to a destination
prefix in a foreign AS.
2.1.1 Prefixes
Prefixes in CIDR conveniently break up the 32-bit1 IP address space by designating far
greater variety in network sizes than the classful system of the early internet. In this earlier
1The 32-bit address space is governed by the IPv4, but in 1995 it was already known this space would
eventually face the issue of address exhaustion. CIDR can ameliorate but not solve this problem. 128-bit
addresses, governed by the then-new IPv6 protocol, were introduced in 1998 [18], [19].
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implementation, the IP address space was divided into five address classes of fixed size.
CIDR makes networks classless by dividing them using subnetting. Whereas in the classful
implementation, the number of network bits may be only 8, 16, or 24 (classes A, B, and C,
respectively), subnetting allows any number of the bits in the 32-bit space to be network
bits2. See Table 2.1 for more detail. It does this by application of a bitwise mask called a
subnet mask; in CIDR notation, an IP address with an associated subnet mask is called a
prefix [20].
As a practical example, the prefix 10.128.240.50/30 indicates that the first 30 bits are
network bits. Thus, its subnet mask is 255.255.255.252, which means this subnet can
effectively address two hosts. The network address is the result of a bitwise AND operation
between the subnet mask and the IP address, resulting in 10.128.240.48. Thus, two hosts
can be addressed at 10.128.240.49 and 10.128.240.50. Finally, its broadcast address is
10.128.240.51.
Table 2.1. Subnetting allows subdivision of networks, ameliorating the prob-
lem of address exhaustion by obviating the need to upgrade to a class B
network—65,534 possible hosts—to effectively address 255 hosts, which is
beyond the capacity of a class C network. Through subnetting, a class B can
be divided as below for more granular network size options [20].
Network Bits Subnet Mask Number of Subnets Number of Hosts
/16 255.255.0.0 0 65,534
/17 255.255.128.0 0 32,766
/18 255.255.192.0 2 16,382
/19 255.255.224.0 6 8,190
...
/28 255.255.255.240 4,094 14
/29 255.255.255.248 8,190 6
/30 255.255.255.252 16,382 2
For this thesis, it should be noted that many BGP communities (Section 2.2), particularly
blackholing communities, can only be applied to an announced prefix of particular size. For
2In practice, subnets commonly have between 8 (equivalent to a class A network) and 30 (capable of
addressing two hosts) network bits [20].
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example, AS 7922 defines the community 7922:666, a blackholing community which can
only be applied to a prefix with 32 network bits (i.e., a single host) [6]; this is typical among
blackholing communities. In general, blackholed prefixes are as specific as possible to allow
normal service to non-affected hosts. Blackholing services will be negotiated between
AS operators [21]. Similarly, AS 209 defines the community 209:999, an Outbound:
Announcement community specific to /24 or greater routes.
Thus, a prefix allows BGP to communicate the destinations available on a particular AS; a
particular BGP speaker advertises that a prefix is in its domain, and the ASes that hear this
announcement know where traffic destined for a host on that prefix must go. To get there,
however, BGP routers must know a path through the internet topology.
2.1.2 Autonomous System Path
After a BGP speaker announces a prefix is reachable on its domain, the news propagates
to other ASes. To effectively route traffic to that prefix, downstream ASes must know
how to reach that domain in the global topology of AS interconnections. In BGP, this is
communicated by the mandatory “AS_PATH” and “ORIGIN” attributes of the protocol.
When making an announcement, a given AS will set the “ORIGIN” and “AS_PATH” to its
own AS number. When an external peer receives it, the peer prepends its own AS number
to the “AS_PATH” attribute before sending it to the next external peer. This allows BGP to
detect and prevent routing loops.
For example, if a speaker at AS 7322 advertises prefix 198.51.100.0/24 as reachable in its
domain, it will set the “ORIGIN” and “AS_PATH” to 7322 and send the announcement to
a peer AS; e.g., AS 2914. AS 2914 will not alter the “ORIGIN” attribute, but will prepend
its own AS number to the “AS_PATH” attribute so it now equals the sequence 2914 7322.
ASes along an announcement’s path will continue to do so, such that an AS arbitrarily-many
hops away knows it needs first to traverse the ASes whose paths were prepended before it
can reach the “ORIGIN” AS rightmost in the “AS_PATH” [1].
If an announcement reaches an ASwith a path value equal to 3320 5459 2914 7322, then
that AS knows a host within its domain trying to reach a web server at 198.51.100.21 can
reach the AS where that host is located by sending its traffic first to AS 3320. AS 3320 can
then forward this traffic to AS 5459, and so on until it reaches AS 7322. However, a real AS
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often has several paths from which to choose, and their numbers are continually changing
as paths are withdrawn or as policy dictates.
Indeed, choice of a particular path is a multi-faceted problem in BGP, not least because in
the real world links are continually going down, prefixes become unreachable on a given
AS, the internet topology shifts, and so on. An important metric used in path selection is
the so-called “AS_PATH”; see Section 2.1.5 for more detail. Furthermore, the “AS_PATH”
is used extensively for traffic engineering; for example, an AS may prepend its AS number
multiple times to the path so routes through it are de-preferred. This provides a mechanism
by which to align routing policies with economic constraints and preferences [1], [5].
2.1.3 Peering Sessions
BGP sessions are Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connections between BGP routers
on which BGP messages are passed. Such sessions consist of the exchange of four different





To initiate a peering session, a speaker sends an OPEN packet and waits for a peer to respond
in kind. In these OPEN messages, the BGP routers exchange desired values for the hold
time3; both routers will use the lower value. A KEEPALIVE interval is established as, at
maximum, a third of the hold time. The speaker responds with a KEEPALIVE packet, and
the session is officially established.
UPDATE messages are now sent which contain a set of path attributes and Network Layer
Reachability Information (NLRI), namely, the prefixes that are advertised as reachable. Pre-
viously advertised prefixes that are no longer reachable will be sent as a withdrawn route. As
the BGP routers learn routes through these peering sessions, they will update their internal
Routing Information Base (RIB), which stores information about inbound UPDATEs, local
3The hold time is the amount of time a peer will wait for incoming BGP messages before assuming the
peer has gone down. A peer can reject a hold time and thus refuse to establish the session [1], but this never
happens in practice [22].
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routing information, and outbound routes the router will send as an UPDATE to its peer.
If a BGP router in such a session has no UPDATE messages to send, it will send a
KEEPALIVE message to inform its peer that it is still active and that the session is still live.
As a form of error handling - if, for example, a peer receives an unacceptable parameter -
NOTIFICATION messages may be sent and the peering attempt will fail or the session will
close.
It is additionally important to note that BGP sessions may be to external peers, called eBGP,
or internal to routers within an AS, called iBGP. The latter type is a means to forward eBGP
advertisements through a network [1], [22].
2.1.4 Path Exploration
The BGP operates in real time, and once a peering session is established, new reachability
information propagates via UPDATE messages. ASes that receive this new route must in-
clude it in their decision process and, if the route is now preferred, update downstreamASes.
Due to the interconnected nature of the topology, combinedwith natural delays in processing
and propagating new reachability information, many messages may be exchanged as better
paths are iteratively discovered. This message exchange is known as “path convergence”
and continues until the network has converged to adopt the new information.
To reduce instability, the BGP has a Minimum Route Advertisement Interval (MRAI) with
a suggested value of 30 seconds: if, for example, there is an UPDATE for the same prefix
every five seconds, nothing is sent for that prefix until the interval elapses. This ensures
only the most recent information is sent to peers. Additionally, BGP implements a Route
Flap Damping (RFD) mechanism to penalize BGP speakers which announce a large number
of updates in a short interval, called “flapping.” Routes are suppressed when the penalty
for this exceeds a set threshold; if the flapping behavior stops, the route will eventually be
un-suppressed over time [23].
However, when a route is withdrawn because a prefix is no longer reachable, BGP routers
will enter a phase of path exploration in which they search for longer and longer paths.
In the Routing Information Protocol (RIP), this results in the “count to infinity” problem,
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wherein paths continue to grow infinitely4 By contrast, in BGP, the MRAI allows routers
time to withdraw these routes and the “AS_PATH” attribute allows BGP to immediately
ignore paths with loops. Therefore, while this bad news will travel more slowly as BGP
continues to explore longer paths, it will not do so infinitely [1], [24].
2.1.5 Path Selection
Path selection in the BGP is a multi-faceted problem, and is accomplished through the BGP
consecutive decision process. The results of the process update the contents of the local
RIB. Crucially, each AS may apply their own criteria for evaluating routes.
Generally, the most important factors in the decision process - which can vary by imple-
mentation - are the values of the following:
1. The Path Length (“AS_PATH”) is how BGP distinguishes shorter paths; note that
this may be influenced by route manipulation due to path prepending. Prepending
communities are often used to influence this value. Paths with detected loops are
immediately ignored.
2. Local Preference (“LOCAL_PREF”) is an attribute which propagates only in in-
ternal BGP sessions; its default value is 100. Lower values are less preferred. It is
commonly used for route redistribution for business purposes; see Section 2.1.6.
3. TheMulti-Exit Discriminator (MED) provides a mechanism to manipulate another
AS to select a certain route when there are multiple entry points; lower values are
preferred. Some ASes use communities to influence this value [6].
4. The IGP Metric is used by operators that administer multiple contiguous but in-
dependent ASes and want to utilize a minimizing distance metric for path selection
similar to the way an IGP works5.
The algorithm that evaluates these metrics, among other factors, is implementation-
dependent. In general, a BGP router applies its local Policy Information Base (PIB) to
inbound routes stored in its RIB. The results of this process are the routes that it will
advertise to peers and are stored in the outbound routes section of its RIB [1], [25]–[28].
4In RIP, fortunately “infinity” is equal to 16, or one more than the number of hops it allows [24].




Routing in BGP is heavily influenced by economic factors. Indeed, as ASes are hetero-
geneous by nature, routes exchanged between them will generally reflect the dynamics in
their relationship through application of specific policies that affect path selection, such as
path prepending to steer traffic and changes to parameters used as input to the consecutive
BGP decision process [1], [29]. The “LOCAL_PREF” attribute is commonly used for this
purpose [27], and is thus also a common BGP community target in signaling semantics [3],
[8].





C2P and P2C relationships are characterized by one AS, the customer, paying the provider
to obtain connectivity to the larger internet. A P2P relationship is one in which two ASes
have agreed to exchange traffic between their customers, usually without charging the other.
This is called “settlement-free,” meaning that each AS merely retains the revenue from their
own customers. Finally, S2S, a pair of ASes, siblings, obtain connectivity to the rest of the
internet through one another. Typically, sibling ASes belong to the same organization. For
this reason, a provider generally has a greater node degree6 than its customers. Similarly,
any two peers are typically of comparable degree [29], [30].
Consequently, these relationships are a large factor in routing decisions. This is possible
because a multi-homed AS can refuse to act as a transit AS for other ASes, or for a restricted
set of its peers, and preferentially select certain ASes through which to route traffic [31].
This therefore suggests that, absent route leakage or BGP misconfiguration, AS operators
will tend to implement policies which create “valley-free” routes. That is, once traffic has
traversed a P2P or P2C link, it should not traverse a C2P or P2P link. Figure 2.1 displays an
example of the dynamics of inter-AS relationships.
6The degree of a node is the number of edges incident upon it; that is, the number of connections an AS
has to its neighbors.
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Figure 2.1. If traffic transits from Customer A to ISP A, policies will tend to
enforce a traffic flow that reflects the economic reality. Traffic should transit
only through the peering link to ISP B, thence to Customer B, or from ISP
A through the Transit AS to ISP B before reaching Customer B. Traversing
through the Dual-Homed Customer creates an undesirable routing “valley”;
the Dual-Homed Customer is paying for traffic through its link to ISP B, and
therefore wants to avoid sending another AS’s traffic through their link.
2.1.7 BGP and Security
Security in BGP is a chief concern among researchers. RFC 7454 [14] states that BGP
speakers should apply an Access Control List (ACL) to disregard all traffic to TCP port 179
from an unknown or forbidden peer. However, as the current implementation of the protocol
lacks intrinsic cryptographic protections, this is insufficient. It is thus susceptible to abuse
of both the confidentiality and integrity of a particular UPDATE.
Furthermore, BGP has featured in a number of attacks andmisconfiguration events that have
affected traffic globally. In 1997, as the result of a misconfiguration, AS 7007 announced
itself as the origin of the best path to most of the internet, disrupting reachability for
several hours. In 2008, Pakistan Telecom (AS 17557) announced a path to the prefix
208.65.153.0/24; its provider propagated this fake announcement throughout the internet.
This hijacked global traffic to YouTube for over two hours [11], [12].
Broadly, a hacker’s objectives may include prefix blackholing, traffic redirection, traffic
subversion, or creation of instability in the global routing tables [11]. Mitseva et al. [32]
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identified the following principle attack types in BGP:
1. Data FalsificationAttacks:AmaliciousASmay inject false data into BGPmessages.
Vectors include:
(a) Prefix Hijacking: This is an attack whereby an AS falsely claims to originate a
prefix for which it is not responsible. This can lead to a Multiple Origin Au-
tonomous System (MOAS) conflict. Attackers can avoid telltaleMOAS conflicts
by announcing prefixes that are part of the 20% of the global prefix space which
is not announced.
(b) Subprefix Hijacking: Attackers can also avoid MOAS conflicts by announcing
a subnetwork of an existing prefix that it has not been delegated. This is also
called a de-aggregation attack.
(c) AS Path Forgery: In such an attack, attackers alter the “AS_PATH” to announce
a fake link between their AS and the victim AS to avoid a MOAS conflict and
induce a “one-hop” prefix hijack. This can also be done with subprefixes.
(d) Interception Attack: If an attacker has a valid route to the victim’s AS, s/he can
induce traffic to be intercepted before reaching its intended destination without
disturbing connectivity.
(e) Suppression/Replay Attack: A malicious AS can replay or suppress withdrawal
of a route that has previously been announced.
(f) Collision Attack: This attack occurs when two colluding, non-neighboring ASes
create a virtual tunnel and run aBGP session through it to announce forged routes
without risk of a MOAS.
2. Protocol Manipulation Attacks: These are attacks in which the malicious AS seeks
to manipulate properties of the BGP itself. Vectors include:
(a) MED modification: a malicious AS may tamper with parameters that are used
as input in the BGP consecutive decision process.
(b) Exploiting the RFD andMRAI Timer:Malicious ASesmay artificially withdraw
a route and subsequently re-announce it. AS see this as flapping and suppress
it; meanwhile, the MRAI timer delays distribution of UPDATES, making this
route seem unreachable. See Section 2.1.4 for more detail on RFD and MRAI.
3. Data Misuse Attacks: This is a type of attack in which ASes use correct routing data
for a malicious purpose. Vectors include:
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(a) DoS: Attackers may induce heavy congestion on routes carrying BGP traffic,
causing peering sessions to fail. After sessions are reestablished, the routers need
to exchange full routing tables, increasing load on the devices and additionally
causing convergence delays.
(b) Route Leakage: This attacks occurs when an AS propagates routes to ASes that
were not intended to receive such routes under the terms of economic agreements
between them, violating valley-free export rules (see Section 2.1.6).
Thus, attacks on or misconfigurations of the BGP induce significant connectivity problems
in the internet, leading to denial of service, instability, or interception of traffic. For this
reason, proposals have been made for a secure version of the protocol. The most promising
is BGPsec, but thus far it has proved too computationally expensive to deploy in the real
world [12]. By contrast, Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), which provides a
mechanism by which to cryptographically validate—via certificates—association between
a specific AS numbers or prefixes with the holders of those number resources, and is slowly
being deployed [33]. Additionally, more than 100 ISPs have agreed to the Mutually-Agreed
Norms for Routing Security (MANRS) [34].
Unfortunately, all implementations of secure versions of the BGP fail to enforce a protection
mechanism for BGP communities, which Streibelt et al. [5] recently demonstrated is an
additional source of misconfiguration events and a potential attack vector.
2.2 BGP Communities
In the 90s, the internet was growing explosively, and requirements for inter-domain routing
were becoming increasingly complex. The BGP communities attribute, first specified in
1996, is intended to provide a mechanism to help implement such requirements by offering
a means to effect fine-grained control of routing policy to an aggregate of routes [2].
Communities are particularly useful for applying routing policies to groups of destinations
which share a common property, hence their name. This allows them to encode passive
semantics about a route, such as its geographic origin, as well as active semantics such as a
signal to blackhole traffic for a prefix.
The community attribute is an optional, transitive field of variable length; this means, unlike
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some other attributes, the communities attached to a route announced by a speaker may be
passed on from one AS to the next. In fact, this is often required so customers can signal
upstream providers [4]. However, communities are generally intended for use between two
direct AS neighbors; they are not supposed to propagate widely in the internet, but recent
investigations have revealed this is often the case. In fact, as many as 14% of transit ASes
forward communities that they receive, potentially inducing unknown effects in ASes far
beyond the intended target [5], [9]. Since the field is of variable length, an announcement
often contains multiple communities values.
Unfortunately, community semantics are very poorly defined. This is a major contributing
factor to their improper propagation in the internet. RFC 1997, which originally specified
the attribute, defines a common syntax for 32-bit communities, whereby the first two octets
designate an AS number and the second two octets represent a specific community value.
It further defines three so-called “well-known” communities; that is, communities of global
significance. As of September 24, 2019, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
recognizes 14 well-known communities proposed in subsequent RFCs [4], [5], [35]:
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Table 2.2. RFC 1997 defines three well-known communities and a common
syntax for reading them and defining new ones. As of September 24, 2019,
the IANA recognizes the following 14 well-known communities. Source: [4],
[10], [35]–[39].
Purpose Hex Value Standard
Syntax
Meaning
GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN 0xFFFF0000 65535:0 Reduce traffic loss: inform peer of
planned maintenance.
ACCEPT_OWN 0xFFFF0001 65535:1 Accept routes with router’s same
ORIGIN AS (for route reflectors).
ROUTE_FILTER_TRANSLATED_v4 0xFFFF0002 65535:2 Attach translated Route Targets (RTs)
for VPNv4 route filtering.
ROUTE_FILTER_v4 0xFFFF0003 65535:3 Attach RTs for VPNv4 route filtering
as-is.
ROUTE_FILTER_TRANSLATED_v6 0xFFFF0004 65535:4 Attach translated RTs for VPNv6
route filtering.
ROUTE_FILTER_v6 0xFFFF0005 65535:5 Attach RTs for VPNv6 route filtering
as-is.
LLGR_STALE 0xFFFF0006 65535:6 Mark stale routes retained (long-lived
graceful restart).
NO_LLGR 0xFFFF0007 65535:7 This route not suitable for long-lived
graceful restart.
ACCEPT_OWN_NEXTHOP 0xFFFF0008 65535:8 Accept routes with router’s same
NEXT_HOP IP address (for route re-
flectors).
BLACKHOLE 0xFFFF029A 65535:666 Drop any traffic to this prefix.
NO_EXPORT 0xFFFFFF01 65535:65281 This route should not leave the BGP
confederation.
NO_ADVERTISE 0xFFFFFF02 65535:65282 Do not advertise this route to other
peers.
NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED 0xFFFFFF03 65535:65283 Do not advertise this route to external
peers, including those in confedera-
tion.
NOPEER 0xFFFFFF04 65535:65284 Do not advertise this prefix in a bilat-
eral peering session.
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Aside from the communities listed in Table 2.2 and several reserved ranges of values, AS
operators are free to define their own communities according to the common syntax defined
in RFC 19977. This allows them to encode passive and active semantics in the final two
octets of the field. This means they are free to designate any value in a space equal to 216
as a particular community service [4]. For example, Level 3 (AS 3356) allows customers to
set local preference to 70 with the community 3356:70 [6].
This has produced variable schemata for community definitions betweenASes. Additionally,
many ASes do not publish their community definitions publicly; they are available only to
their customers [5], and the number of unique communities almost tripled between 2010
and 2018 [9], exacerbating the problem. This research is an attempt to quantitatively study
these semantics, to the extent possible.
2.2.1 Taxonomy
To better categorize BGP community semantics, Bonaventure et al. [8] developed the first
unified taxonomy for communities. This taxonomy is displayed in Figure 2.2:
Figure 2.2. This first community taxonomy, developed in 2008, divides com-
munities by their point of application or when they are added: i.e., when a
route is received (Inbound), for routes that are or are not advertised to other
peers (Outbound), and when traffic should be dropped to the advertised
prefix altogether (Blackhole). Adapted from [8].
The Bonaventure taxonomy designates three principal categories of communities based on
where they are relevant in BGP sessions. These are subdivided based on the most common
meanings these communities encode or the services they signal:
7This research has in fact found that the semantics of many ASes are in conflict with this paradigm.
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1. Inbound: Inbound communities are added or used by a router when a route is received
by a router during an eBGP session.
(a) Local Pref: These communities are used to influence the “LOCAL_PREF”
attribute, as has been discussed in Sections 2.1.5 and 2.1.6 in more detail. It
is an important factor in the BGP consecutive decision process. Thus, it is an
example of an active community semantic. For example, the community 174:10
tells AS 174 to set the local preference for that route to 10.
(b) Route Tagging: These communities encode passive information about a route;
they are “tagged” with this information.
i. IXP: indicates the route was learned at an IXP; e.g., 4589:14901 informs
AS 4589 that it learned the route at the IXP Deutscher Commercial Internet
Exchange (DE-CIX).
ii. Type of Peer: indicates the relationship the receiving AS has with the peer;
e.g., 3356:123 tells AS 3356 that it learned that route from a customer [6].
This is to help distinguish the relationship between ASes for learned routes.
iii. Geographic: indicates the geographic origin where the route was received;
e.g., 3356:500 tells AS 3356 that the route was received in the United
Kingdom.
iv. AS: indicates the AS from which a route was learned; e.g., 15997:1080 is
used by AS 15997 to mark a route from Tata Communications.
2. Blackhole: Blackhole communities are designed to tell the receiving AS to drop all
traffic to the prefix it advertises; these are thus an active semantic. The taxonomy
subdivides this by the scope and locality of the effect.
(a) Global Blackhole: indicates that traffic is blocked everywhere within the receiv-
ing peer (generally an ISP).
(b) Border Blackhole: indicates that traffic should be blocked at the peer’s border
routers.
(c) Upstream Blackhole: indicates that traffic be blocked by the peer’s upstream
transit provider before it enters the peer’s network.
3. Outbound: Outbound communities are designed for traffic engineering. That is, they
have active semantics. In particular, they are used for redistribution of routes at routers
downstream.
(a) Announcement: marks a route that should not be announced, typically to a
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specific peer or group of peers. For example, 2914:4029 tells AS 2914 not to
advertise the route to any peer in North America.
(b) Path Prepending: induces prepending of the AS number = times, where typically
= is a number between one and four, when propagating this prefix (see Section
2.1.2). This is usually applied to specific peers or groups of peers. For exam-
ple, 2914:4023 tells AS 2914 to prepend 2914 to the path three times when
announcing it to peers in North America [6].
This taxonomy functionally enables this research by providing classifications to attach
to particular community values. As many of these encode active signaling semantics,
understanding them in situ is a valuable stepping stone to creating a functional anomaly
detector for BGP communities.
Furthermore, the current distribution of these communities according to this taxonomy is
a secondary research question this work seeks to study. Bonaventure et al. [8] were able to
estimate this distribution: see Table 2.3:
Table 2.3. A 2008 estimation of the distribution of passive and active BGP
community semantics. Note that this is the distribution of defined semantics,
rather than a proportion of the communities seen, for example, at a route
collector. Adapted from [8].















Table 2.3 indicates that the majority of communities defined are for route redistribution
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purposes; i.e., for path prepending and announcement.
2.2.2 BGP Extended and Large Communities
The communities presented thus far have been 32-bit communities. However, RFC 4360 [40] 
introduced 64-bit communities, called “Extended Communities,” to the BGP in 2006. Ac-
cording to the specification, extended communities a re i ntended t o provide an extended 
range for community values to alleviate the fear of overlap and add structure to the com-
munity space. More specifically, extended communities provide structure by inclusion of a 
specified “Type” field which designates the type of application for which a given community 
value will be used. Additionally, RFC 8092 introduced so-called “Large Communities” in 
2017; these large communities are 96 bits, or 12 octets, in length.
Unfortunately, for purposes of this research, extended and large communities have not seen 
widespread use and thus are not yet a significant factor. However, this is likely to change 
soon. As of March 25, 2019, as many as several hundred large communities were viewed at 
route collectors at the Routing Information Service (RIS) adminhistered by RIPE .
Additionally, and more importantly, there are nearly 20,000 4-byte AS numbers currently 
visible in the global routing table, and Routing Information Registries (RIRs) are currently 
at the point where they are mostly assigning 4-byte AS numbers. This indicates large 
community usage will continue to increase generally [9], [15].
2.2.3 Communities and Security
Given the inherent lack of security in the BGP, communities currently offer a vector for 
potential attackers. Indeed, as discussed in Section 2.1.7, even current proposals for securing 
the BGP make no provisions for enforcing the security of communities. Streibelt et al. [5] has 
demonstrated practical scenarios in which communities can be leveraged to deny service, 
improve service, impose additional cost, and intercept traffic. In fact, this study was the 
inspiration for this thesis.
These attacks include use of community services for:
1. RTBH: by using blackholing communities for a particular AS, a malicious actor
can effectively launch a DoS attack that cripples its reachability. This can be done in
24
conjunction with prefix hijacking to drop traffic at the destination AS, denying service
universally.
2. Traffic Steering: though harder to initiate since ASes typically respond only to steer-
ing attempts from their customers, it is possible to influence both the local preference
and path prepending behavior in providers immediately upstream. However, AS re-
lationships make it harder to use these communities against ASes farther away, even
when the communities propagate. This may be most useful in conjunction with prefix
hijacking. See Section 2.1.6 for more detail on AS relationships and their effects on
path selection.
3. Route Manipulation: an attacker can induce a redistribution of routes using specific
communities; e.g., by sending a community to redistribute the route for a prefix to a
particular AS along with a community to suppress that announcement. Notably, this
requires knowledge about the community evaluation order for the intermediate AS.
2.3 Machine Learning
Machine learning is a method of data analysis that attempts to automate the process of 
building a model. Many models are classifiers for a given problem: for example, classifying 
different species of flowers on the basis of a set of observed features present in the data. 
In a supervised method, each species will be labeled, and each unique label is an example 
of a class. Simply put, a model is an attempt to train a classifier to correctly predict the 
probability that a particular flower belongs to a particular class. At its core, such a model 
is a solution to an optimization problem that attempts to minimize a loss function; i.e., the 
probability that the model incorrectly classifies an instance of a class [41]. This research 
attempts to use such a model to classify particular BGP communities.
2.3.1 Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs)
An ANN is one of the most common types of machine learning models. They arose from 
attempts to recreate the form and function of the human brain in the field o f Artificial 
Intelligence (AI), and though they do this poorly, they function well as classifiers. More 
specifically, the brain is composed of individual neurons, cells which receive input signals 
from surrounding cells and act if the cumulative input of these cells exceeds a given
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threshold. ANNs are based on a simplified form o f neurons and t heir interconnections, 
wherein individual nodes with an activation function are connected in layers.
The simplest form of ANN is a single-layer perceptron. A perceptron is only capable of 
solving linear problems; that is, it can only fit the data if the classes are linearly separable.
It does this by taking a number of inputs; i.e., features of the data, and assigning weights to 
them. A bias is also applied to the activation function at each node. The node then transforms 
its input into an output signal with respect to a threshold just as in a real neuron (the bias 
adjusts this calculation). Like a real neuron, a perceptron learns by adjusting the weights 
and biases until it optimally reduces its error rate.
An MLP is simply a perceptron with multiple layers; the input layer is connected to one or 
more fully-connected “hidden” layers which enable it to solve non-linear problems. Such a 
network learns by first computing the output given some set of inputs, evaluating the result, 
and then propagating the error backward in a process appropriately called backpropagation. 
Since, in an MLP, input to one layer is a function of the input to the preceding layer8, 
backpropagation is merely an application of the chain rule of derivatives. Other types of 
neural architectures are commonly derived by manipulating the way neurons in the hidden 
layers are interconnected.
The amount that weights are updated during the training process is called the learning rate, 
and is adjustable9: the higher the value, the more rapidly the model changes. In stochastic 
gradient descent, the prototypical optimization algorithm for such a network, the network 
is iteratively attempting to guess, at each epoch, the error gradient. That is, it tries to guess 
how far the loss function is away from its minimum, and adjusts the weights and biases 
(the parameters) accordingly. The learning rate determines how much the parameters are 
adjusted at each epoch.
This process continues until the model converges at the minimum of the loss function, at 
which point the model has ideally become a competent classifier for the data. At this point, 
it can be used against novel testing data to evaluate its accuracy; if it has high performance
8For this reason, an MLP is called a “feed forward” network [42].
9Adjustable values that control the learning process are called “hyperparameters,” as they do not change
between epochs. They are distinct from parameters like weights and biases, which the model learns on its own
during training. Hyperparameters can be tuned through a grid search of possible combinations of values.
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on the training set, but poor performance on the testing set, the model is likely overfitting
the training data. This occurs when a model attunes itself too strongly to the training data,
and thus fails to generalize well. Some simple solutions to overfitting include setting an
early stopping point for the optimization algorithm, using :-many folds to train the data
iteratively, gathering more data, removing features, etc. [41], [42].
2.3.2 Random Forests
A Random Forest is another classification algorithm that relies on recursive partitioning of
the feature space. This is accomplished through classification trees which infer classification
boundaries through the separation of nodes in the tree. This can also be represented as a
rectangular partition of the feature space. Therefore, this approach will produce every
possible combination that can be derived through recursive splitting. An estimate of class
probabilities can be inferred from their relative frequencies in each partition (i.e., a terminal
node of the tree).
However, individual classification trees are susceptible to instability due to small changes in
the data. The boundary defined at each partition, sometimes called the “cutpoint,” strongly
depends on the distribution of observations present in the training data. Additionally, an
individual tree’s prediction will be piecewise constant; that is, it may vary too much for
small changes in the values of the predictor variables (the feature set).
A Random Forest, by contrast, is an ensemble method which computes a prediction not from
a single tree, but from a set of regression trees using a bootstrap sample of the learning data.
The prediction of all trees can thus be combined, or “bagged,” to create smoother decision
boundaries and improve the overall accuracy of the forest. A particular facet of Random
Forests in general is that they introduce additional diversity by randomly restricting the set
of predictor variables used at each split of the tree. For this reason, Random Forests are
particularly good at inferring even weak interactions between predictor variables [43].
2.3.3 Binary Relevance for Multi-Class Problems
Multi-class data, such as the BGP communities that are the subject of this thesis, are
difficult for many classifiers to handle natively. Instead, categorical labels are typically one-
hot encoded such that every individual label becomes an array of binary variables equal in
27
number to the total number of classes. For example, for the labels “red,” “green,” and “blue,”
red becomes [1, 0, 0], green becomes [0, 1, 0] and blue becomes [0, 0, 1]. To effectively
train the model, an individual classifier is built for each label. For this reason, this method
is called “Binary Relevance” or “One-vs-All.” The classifier with the highest output for an
instance determines the class prediction for the model [41].
2.3.4 Class Imbalance
Real-world data often has a class imbalance. That is, the training data has a minority class
with insufficient samples for training. This is called a minority class, and a classifier may
struggle to learn how to recognize it. In fact, it is likely to never predict it at all in sufficiently
skewed data. As demonstrated in Table 2.3 and observed in the data collection process, the
BGP community taxonomy has such an imbalance.
Fortunately, there are multiple methods to train models from such data:
1. Random Oversampling: Random Oversampling simply takes samples of the minor-
ity class and duplicates them until it is better represented proportionally.
2. Synthetic Minority Oversampling (SMOTE): generates synthetic samples from
a minority class. These samples are linear combinations of two samples from the
minority class, increasing the number of samples present in the training data; this
linear combination is chosen by selecting a random nearest neighbor from a k-Nearest
Neighbors algorithm and created at a shared point between them [44].
3. Adaptive Synthetic Sampling (ADASYN): uses the density distribution to determine
the number of synthetic instances to generate for each minority class; it focuses
particularly on generating samples next to samples that were classified incorrectly




This chapter presents the methods and procedures used in the course of this research into
BGP communities. In particular, this chapter discusses the data collection process, feature
engineering, model selection and validation, and application of such models to recent
BGP data. Note that, throughout this chapter, for the sake of simplicity, communities will be
presented in the standard syntax proposed by RFC 1997 as discussed in Section 2.2. Further,
discussion of community semantics reflects the taxonomy presented in Section 2.2.1.
3.1 Data Collection
Collecting ground-truth data was the longest and most challenging part of this research. The
major source of data for this research was the Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis
(CAIDA) Community Dictionary Dataset [46]; web scraping was used as an additional
source of data.
3.1.1 The CAIDA Dictionary Dataset
The BGP Community Dictionary Dataset, provided by CAIDA, was a useful but limited
source of data for this research. This dataset contains only Inbound communities, particularly
geographic and IXP tags; as described in Section 2.2.1, this represents only two out of the
ten classification subcategories this research sought to classify. Thus, although it offers
7,311 community definitions, it was incomplete for purposes of this research. See Table 3.1
for more detail.
As a preliminary feasibility study, this dataset was examined for clustering or patterns
within the semantic space in a three-dimensional plot examining data by community value,
AS number, and the geographic location which they encode, as inferred from the standard
community syntax. The results of this are presented in Chapter 4.
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Table 3.1. The distribution of BGP communities used as training data in this
research according to the standard taxonomy. In total, 10,027 community
definitions were used from a pool of 848 unique ASes. The CAIDA Dictio-
nary Dataset contributed 72.91% of these communities, while the remaining
27.09% were collected via web scraping. Note that, given the disparity of
sources, these data are not expected to represent the distribution of defined
semantics in the wild. This imbalance was adjusted for modeling as explained
in Section 3.2.3.
















Given the limitations of the Dictionary Dataset, significant additional data—totalling 2,716
defined communities—were manually collected to gather information on the other commu-
nity classes in the standard taxonomy.
To this end, web scraping was employed to automate the workload of collecting data.
Web scraping is the process of programmatically extracting useful data from Hypertext
Markup Language (HTML) pages on the internet. A significant number of community
definitions were thus extracted from the community guide at One Step Consulting [6]
using the BeautifulSoup library in Python. One Step is a technical consulting company that
gathers data fromprovider sourcematerial; e.g., published guides or queries tomajor registry
databases such as that of RIPE. This information was spot-checked where possible with
public guides from the ASes under study, for example the publicly available communities
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guide at Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT), a Tier-One provider AS [7]. Communities
noted as legacy definitions were not added to the dataset.
Due to the disparity of formats for the presentation of data on the website, even with web
scraping this requiredmanual adjustment unique to eachHTML page containing a particular
AS’s community definitions; the programmatic equivalent was more time-consuming than
simply doing so manually.
Additionally, many such definitions would require significant natural language processing;
the explanations for communities are sometimes presented in very diverse formats, with
critical informationwritten in plain English before a particular section, or use letter variables
to represent potential values in a definition. For example, NTT defines several communities
with the form 65442:nnn, whichmeans prepend twice to peer “nnn” in Asia, where “nnn” is
meant to be replaced with the AS number of the peer in question [7]. Similarly, TeliaSonera
community prepending definitions are of the form 1299:252x, where G can be the number
of prepends (typically any number between zero and three) or nine, which signifies “do not
announce” to a certain peer.
For this reason, there was insufficient time to use all of the communities defined at [6];
ASes of particularly high rank according to CAIDA’s database10 were preferentially chosen
as they are expected to represent communities of higher interest to the research community;
however, some communities were also taken from ASes of lower rank for classes which
were under-represented. Future workwould greatly benefit from additional time or resources
spent in data collection; e.g., via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
This data was stored in Comma-Separated Values (CSV) format and a manual classification
was added to each definition, to serve as the true label for the supervised models developed
to demystify this semantic space.
3.1.3 The Trouble with Taxonomy
Unfortunately, as there is no unifying semantic for most communities, a small but not
insignificant number of communities do not conform to the taxonomy presented by [8]; for
10The rank of a particular AS, as defined by CAIDA, is a topological estimation of its customer cone size;
i.e., the number of customers or indicated customers an AS has [16].
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example, European Commercial Internet Exchange (ECIX), a major IXP, defines Round
Trip Time (RTT) communities for granular application of policy with respect to latency
information. The community 65030:ms means, “do not announce this route to peers with an
RTT greater than or equal to the valuems.” Similarly, 65011:0 is an Inbound tag community
that signifies that the RTT is between one and five milliseconds [47].
For purposes of this study, the formerwere classified by their principal effect (i.e., Outbound:
Prepending); for data preprocessing, as with all communities that follow this alternate syntax
(see Section 3.1.4), the first two octetswere taken as the community value and theAS number
was inferred separately. The latter communities can only be labeled as a general “Other”
class; although they certainly fall under the domain of Inbound: Route Tagging, a more
specific class does not exist in the Bonaventure taxonomy, and thus these communities
fall outside the scope of this research. Extremely few such communities were observed in
collected data (see Table 3.1).
Furthermore, since the BGP community field is of variable length, it is often the case that a
route will have multiple communities. In at least one observed case, these communities have
different meanings in different combinations: AS 209 uses 209:888 to signify a peer route
when by itself. Ergo, this is clearly an Inbound: Type of Peer community. However, when
used in conjunction with 209:64740, it means “do not announce to Deutsche Telekom”;
that is, it modifies an Outbound: Announcement community. By contrast, 209:64740 alone
means to announce that route to Deutsche Telekom, and 209:64743means to prepend 209
three times to the AS path (i.e., it is an Outbound: Prepending community). Even more
confusingly, the community string could be 209:888 209:64520 209:64749. Taken to-
gether, this tells AS 209 not to announce to any peers except Deutsche Telekom [48]. The
model developed by this research does not capture this semantic complexity; fortunately,
this was only observed in the semantic schema of one AS. However, there is no regulation
of the community space to preclude it in other ASes from which data were not gathered.
Other communities are effectively multi-label with respect to the Bonaventure taxonomy.
For example, Global Crossing, AS 3549, defines Inbound: Type of Peer communities with
the format 3549:TCCC, where “T” is a type code with value one, two, four, or five to specify
the relationship with the originating peer and “CCC” is a country code (e.g., 3549:4840
is a customer route learned in the United States). This means it tags both Type of Peer and
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Geographic origin; it is multi-label with respect to our taxonomy. A more sophisticated
model would need to be built to effectively predict such complexities; that is, the model
developed herein is expected to perform poorly with respect to such communities. In total,
523 communities such communities were collected. Most of these were from AS 6461,
which defines separate peer and customer (i.e., Inbound: Type of Peer) communities for
specific locations of geographic ingress (i.e., Inbound: Geographic). For this research, these
communities were labeled Inbound: Type of Peer; however, the model’s inability to capture
this complexity is a fundamental limitation that should be addressed in future work.
Additionally, although the standard taxonomy proposed three separate categories of black-
holing based on the scope and locality of their effect, this was very difficult to discern from
ground-truth data; the observed blackholing community definitions rarely offer enough de-
tail to distinguish between them. For this reason, the developed model treats blackholing
generally. The reason for this may be that this is a question of provider implementation of
community application, while these guides are intended for customer use. This is a funda-
mental limitation of this study, and perhaps of semantic classification in general. Further
research into distinguishing between them may require testing community effects in the
wild.
3.1.4 Syntactic Limitations
Additionally, many communities do not follow the syntax proposed in RFC 1997 [4], which
states that “...community attribute values shall be encoded using an autonomous system
number in the first two octets. The semantics of the final two octets may be defined by the
autonomous system.” For example, the IXP DE-CIX, AS number 6695, uses the community
0:6695 to indicate that a route should not be redistributed, and 0:nnn to indicate that a
route should not be redistributed to a specific peer, where “nnn” is the AS number of said
peer.
Conversely, 6695:nnn is used to signify that a route should be redistributed to that particular
peer. Similarly, Level 3, AS 3356, uses 65001:0, 65002:0, 65003:0, and 65004:0 to
signify prepending once, twice, three times, or four times to any peer, respectively. The last
two octets may also be occupied by the AS of a particular peer to specify to whom this
prepending behavior should occur [6]. Fundamentally, this is a limitation of the syntax, as
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such granular encoding information cannot be done easily with the last two bytes of a 32-bit
community. Use of extended or large communities (Section 2.2.2) is a potential solution to
this.
In considering communities of the form xxx:0 or xxx:nnn, where “xxx” is not the AS
number of the defining AS, and “nnn” is the AS number of a target peer, “xxx” was taken as
the community value and the AS number inferred separately during preprocessing. In total,
118 such communities were collected.
3.2 Developing a Model
The intent of this researchwas to attempt to demystify the semantics ofBGPcommunities. To
this end, several One-vs-All models were created with the Python library Scikit-Learn [49].
Choosing the correct classification algorithm as the internal estimators for these was a
crucial part of designing an effective predictive model.
Fortunately, Van Efferen et al. demonstrated that MLPs are useful in flow-based anomaly
detection in Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSes) with appropriate feature extraction due
to their fault tolerance, ability to adapt to changes in information, and resilience to noisy
signals in the data. Their research compared the results of such a model with a J48 Decision
Tree algorithm, which has proven high precision when working with such data [42]. Given
the similarities of the classification problem studied in this thesis—for example, the need to
choose appropriate features in one-dimensional data11—MLPswere chosen as the estimators
in the first model developed adapted. Its efficacy as as estimator was compared with use of
Random Forests, which are “ensembles” of decision trees (see Section 2.3.2).
11TheBGP communities in the dataset created for this research do not have amulti-dimensional component;
features were engineered such that the feature vectors used to train the model are one-dimensional. Data with
additional dimensions (e.g., temporal), such as would occur with packet-based anomaly detection, typically
require more complex neural architectures than a feed-forward MLP. Fully Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) and Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) with Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) architectures are
potential solutions to classification problems involving time-series data [50]. This has implications on future
work in anomalous community detection, and will be discussed further in Section 5.2.
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To train these models, the collated data—collected as described in the preceding section—
were read into a data structure called a DataFrame using the Pandas library. The data were
separated into training and testing datasets and stripped of their labels. Values were then





where D is the mean of the training samples and B is the standard deviation. This scaler
was fitted only to the training data, and applied separately to the testing data. As this was
a multiclass model, labels were one-hot encoded, and the chosen classifier was used in a
Binary Relevance paradigm as explained in Section 2.3.3. Thus, a separate, binary classifier
was optimized to predict each class versus all others.
3.2.1 Feature Engineering
In the wild, operators will typically have only the community string itself from which to
draw features. TheASRank, as determined byCAIDA [16], was determined to be unsuitable
as a feature for this reason, as well as any number of other quantitative values calculated
from historical data, such as a community’s frequency. Ground truth data would be difficult
to collect for such communities as well, and vantage-specific bias would limit the model’s
ability to generalize. Thus, in order to build an effective model, qualitative analysis of this
data alone was used to identify a feature set capable of differentiating individual community
values.
Consequently, the feature set presented in Table 3.2 were engineered from the community
string in an attempt to recognize patterns in the diverse definitions of communities between
ASes. All integers were scaled according to the above formula; the feature’s mean was
calculated columnwise and subtracted for each sample, such that each feature has a mean
of zero and a standard deviation of one.
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Table 3.2. These features were engineered from the collected community
data based on domain knowledge and observed improvement to 1 score for
a particular class on a given seed. In total, thirteen features were engineered
from the community string alone.
Feature Type Explanation
AS Number Integer The number of the AS that defined the community. In the wild, this must be 
inferred from the standard syntax alone; i.e., the most significant word.
Community
Value
Integer The value defined in the least significant word of the community, or the most
significant word in select cases (see Section 3.1.4).
Community-AS
Number Product
Integer The product of the community value and the defining AS was computed for
each instance.
Ends in Zero Boolean Indicates whether the community value ends in zero; many Outbound: An-
nouncement values end in a zero. Many Inbound: Geographic and Inbound:
Local Preference values end in zero as well.
Ends inOne, Two,
Three, or Four
Boolean Indicates whether the community value ends in one, two, three, or four; the
majority of prepending communities end in one of these values as a way to
encode how many prepends an AS should make, regardless of the preceding
digits.
Ends in Nine Boolean Indicates whether the community value ends in nine. Many Outbound: An-
nouncement communities end in this value.
Multiple of Five Boolean Indicates whether the community value is a multiple of five, using modular




Boolean Indicates whether the community value is less than or equal to 200. The
majority of Inbound: Local Preference values observed fit this criterion, as the
default for “LOCAL_PREF” - the policy metric these communities influence
- is 100 and communities rarely deviate from this value by more than 100% in
observed data.
Repeating Boolean Indicates whether, when treated as a string, the community value is a repeating
character. Many Blackhole communities have this form; e.g., 9999 and 666.
Number of Sixes Integer A count of the number of sixes in the community value. Many Blackhole
communities in particular have more sixes, even if they are not the classic
Blackhole value 666.
Number of Zeroes Integer Indicates the number of zeroes in the community value. Many Inbound com-
munities in particular are a multiple of 1,000 and thus have more zeroes than
other values.
Number of Digits Integer Indicates the number of digits in the community value.
Three Digits Boolean Indicates whether the community value is exactly three digits; many Inbound:
Type of Peer are three characters in length.
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3.2.2 Model Validation
This thesis applied the general process of model validation in machine learning. In this
process, features are extracted or engineered from data and preprocessed in a context-
appropriate manner. The dataset can then be separated into training and testing sets. Subse-
quently, an appropriate classification algorithm (e.g., an MLP) is selected, hyperparameters
are chosen, and the model is trained with the training data (or :-many folds thereof) in an
attempt to minimize the loss function according to the model’s optimization algorithm. In
this research, multiple classification algorithms were variously tested, including an MLP
and a Random Forest; the comparative results for each model are presented in Chapter 4.
The subset of the data reserved for testing comprised approximately 25% (2,501 commu-
nities) of the total number of labelled communities collected as described above. Training
and testing sets were stratified with respect to their taxonomic label such that the proportion
of instances of each class in the testing set maintains its proportional representation in all
data. This stratification was applied to ensure the testing set had an adequate number of
samples of each minority class to test its accuracy. Unfortunately, as some classes were
underrepresented in ground-truth data, they were perforce underrepresented in testing data
as well (see Section 3.2.3).
The trainedmodel was then used on the testing data and its accuracy was determined accord-
ing to variousmetrics of performance (see Section 3.2.4). If amodel does poorly, the training
phase can be repeated by introducing new data, selecting new hyperparameters, introduc-
ing new features, etc. In this research, a grid search—performed on a High-Performance
Computing (HPC) cluster—was additionally applied to search for optimal hyperparamters
including learning rate, optimization algorithm (“solver”), hidden layer sizes, and the ac-
tivation function in use at each node. The model, its fitted training scaler, and the label
encoder used to one-hot encode the multi-class labels were saved using Python’s Joblib
library to enable their use in other applications. Additionally, the model is implemented in
a class, such that if no saved model is present, it can be instantiated and retrained in another
context.
3.2.3 Dealing with Class Imbalance
A particular problem with the data collected for this research is that there is a distinct class
imbalance, in terms of actual semantic definitions, present in collected data and observed
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by [8] (see Table 3.1).
As a result of this, a continual problem during the model evaluation process was the model’s
failure to predict certain minority classes. The ideal method of fixing this imbalance would
be to collect more data, but this proved difficult, as described previously. To this end,
Random Oversampling, SMOTE, and ADASYN were variously applied to the training set
to permit the classifier to recognize samples of these classes in the testing data. Random
Oversampling proved most efficacious for this purpose by a small margin of approximately
0.5% in aggregate accuracy depending on the seed. This was an important step in building
the final model.
3.2.4 Metrics of Performance
To evaluate model performance, precision, recall, and 1 score were calculated for each
class, and accuracy was calculated over all testing data. These are equations that employ
true positive and false positive predictions made on the data:
1. A true positive ()?) is when a model predicts that a sample is an instance of a class,
and it is correct in its prediction.
2. A false positive (?) is when the model predicts that a sample is a member of a class,
and it is incorrect in its prediction; the sample is not a member of that class. This is
also called a Type I Error.
3. A true negative ()=) is when a model predicts that a sample is not an instance of a
class, and it is correct in its prediction.
4. A false negative (=) is when the model predicts that a sample is not a member of a
class, and it is incorrect in its prediction. That is, it is a member of that class, and the
model wrongly predicted it was not. This is also called a Type II Error.














1 = 2 ∗
%A428B8>= ∗ '420;;
%A428B8>= + '420;; (3.5)
Recall is therefore the ability of a model to find all relevant data within a dataset, whereas
precision is a model’s ability to identify only the relevant data. A model with low recall but
high precision would miss a lot of predictions for the class, but what it did predict to be
in the class would really be in the class. That is, it is very selective in its predictions, but
usually right when it positively identifies something. Conversely, a model with high recall
but low precision predicts that many things are in the class, and many of them are, but
many of them are not. It positively identifies many things, but often does so wrongly. The
1 score is the harmonic mean between them; accuracy is simply the proportion of correct
predictions.
Additionally, ROC and Precision-Recall curves weremeasured for each sample. ROC curves
plot a model’s true positive rate against its false positive rate. This uses the threshold that
determines if a sample is positively identified as a member of the class; ROC curves
plot how precision vs recall changes while varying this threshold. In other words, starting
at a threshold of 1.0 (positively identifying no instances, truly or falsely), the threshold is
decreased slowly and more positive predictions are made (true positives and false positives),
until every point is positively identified at threshold 0.0. The Area Under the Curve (AUC)
can be then be calculated to determine classification performance. Precision-Recall curves
are similar; they measure precision vs. recall at varying thresholds. Like ROC curves, their
AUC—computed as the average precision over all thresholds—can be taken and used as a
measure of classification performance.
Finally, a confusion matrix was created for the testing data; this is simply a table wherein
the model’s total predictions for a class are separated into their true labels [41], [51], [52].
Accuracy was taken over the entire testing set as well. These metrics were used extensively
in the model validation process; a final, predictive model was iteratively built in this way.
39
3.3 Estimating Taxonomic Distribution
As an immediate, practical application of the best model created, recent routing data was
collected from the RIS database provided by RIPE [53]. Specifically, UPDATEs aggre-
gated in Multi-Threaded Routing Toolkit (MRT) format were taken from multiple vantages,
including the London Internet Exchange (LINX), the London-based Internet Exchange
Point (LONAP), the RIPE Network Coordination Center (NCC) in Amsterdam, and the
New York International Internet Exchange (NYIIX). All collected data for August 10, 2020
between 20:00 and 20:35 were collated and parsed on a local HPC cluster using the Mrt-
parse andMultiprocessing libraries in Python. For comparison, UPDATEswere additionally
collected from the same vantages on September 1, 2020 between 4:00 and 4:35.
The community string, as well as several summary statistics, were extracted from each
UPDATE found in this data, and the model was applied to each community within. A feature
vector was created for each instance in accordance with the feature set engineered for the
training data (see Table 3.2). While ground-truth AS numbers were immediately available
for training data, the defining AS number had to be inferred during this analysis as the most
significantword of a community; given that the community attribute is transitive, it is difficult
to deduce the true, defining AS in real-world data. Future work may apply topological
considerations to increase confidence when the community contravenes the standard syntax
of its foundational RFC. This is, unfortunately, a limitation of any approach that uses
the AS number as a feature. Note also that well-known communities were considered
separately. The best model—trained separately for both the major three categories and the
eight subcategories of the standard taxonomy on all available data—was then used to predict
the taxonomic distribution of community services present in this real-world data; the results




This chapter will present the major findings of this research. This includes a preliminary
examination of semantic structure within ground-truth data, the performance of the vari-
ous models developed in the course of this research, and the results of the estimation of
taxonomic distribution in recent BGP data.
4.1 Analysis of Ground-Truth Data
As explained in Section 3.1.1, 72.91% of community data used in this research was con-
tributed by the CAIDA Dictionary Dataset. One of the primary research questions set forth
in this study is whether there is common structure to community definitions among ASes,
thereby implying that one can make accurate predictions of unknown communities. To ob-
tain intuition over the extant structure of community definitions among ASes, communities
in this dataset were evaluated according to the standard syntax (see Section 2.2) and plotted
against their encoded country as defined by CAIDA’s dictionary in Figure 4.1. Specifically,
the most significant word of the community was inferred to be the defining AS number,
while the least significant word was taken to be the community value. For comparison,
the semantic structure of all collected ground-truth communities, including those obtained
through web scraping, is plotted in Figure 4.2. The most clear pattern this presents is an
approximate horizontal line for Blackhole communities with the community values 666
and 9999. The least significant words for most communities, with the notable exceptions of
the two types of location-encoding ingress communities, are clustered at values less than
10,000.
This analysis indicates that individual geographic encoding for a given country can occupy
any value up to the value of a word (65,535); some ASes define geographic communities
at most of the possible values in this range for different locations in the same country. It
should additionally be noted that certain countries were disproportionately represented in
this data; this is likely due to vantage-specific bias in CAIDA’s data collection process and
more granular geographic community needs for countries with more ASes. See Table 4.1
for a listing of countries for which many different geographic origin communities were
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observed.
In fact, according to these data, some ASes in CAIDA’s dictionary have hundreds of com-
munities which encode the same facility. For example, there are 666 recorded communities 
in the dataset encoding an IXP facility in Ashburn, Virginia operated by Equinix. The most 
significant word in all of these communities is 24115, whereas the least significant word 
takes almost any value possible up to the value of a word. This pattern is common within 
the data and is the source of the vertical series of communities in Figure 4.1.
According to CAIDA, all of these communities denote a specific IXP facility; e .g., one 
operated by Amsterdam Internet Exchange (AMS-IX), ECIX, Equinix, or DE-CIX [46]. 
It is possible that this is merely an artifact of CAIDA’s data collection process; likewise, 
CAIDA’s dictionary may be incorrect, and thus these communities may have different 
semantics altogether, including active semantics (i.e., these communities may be for route 
redistribution). However, several alternative sources of ground-truth data were examined for 
independent verification of selected examples (including vertical series attributed to ASes 
24115, 19996, 39107, and 42476), and neither conflicting nor corroborating definitions for 
these communities could be found [6], [54].
Unfortunately, another implication of this analysis is that, at least among the ASes rep-
resented in this dataset, the standard taxonomy is often not clearly delineated by clear 
ranges in the least significant word. This is particularly concerning because the CAIDA 
Dictionary Dataset purportedly contains only “location-encoding ingress communities,” 
i.e., Inbound: Geographic and Inbound: IXP tags [46]. This precipitated the need for the 
feature engineering approach explained in Section 3.2.1.
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Figure 4.1. Communities present in the CAIDA Dictionary Dataset for Jan-
uary 1, 2018, were plotted in a three-dimensional grid according to the stan-
dard community syntax. Country codes for the encoding region were plotted
along the x-axis, while the community value and the defining AS’s number—
as derived from the standard community syntax—were plotted on the y-axis
and the z-axis, respectively. A colormap was applied along the x-axis; it has
no meaning beyond distinguishing three-dimensional data by country.
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Table 4.1. These countries were encoded with the greatest frequency in
analyzed data. 78 countries with fewer than 100 definitions in the dataset
were aggregated for ease of reference.
Country Code Country Number of Communities Percentage
US United States 1,289 18.00%
NL Netherlands 1,158 16.16%
DE Germany 1,106 15.44%
GB United Kingdom 1,006 14.04%
RU Russia 848 11.83%
PL Poland 300 4.19%
CH Switzerland 258 3.60%
FR France 163 2.28%
IT Italy 102 1.42%
Other 934 13.04%
Total 7,164 100%
Figure 4.2. This figure scatters all 10,027 ground-truth community data
according to the syntax proposed by RFC 1997 to illustrate macro-structure
in known community semantics.
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4.2 Model Performance
To develop the bestmethod of community value estimation, various classification algorithms
were applied to the dataset using the approach described in Section 3.2. This section will
present the accuracy of the models as expressed through various metrics of performance
(see Section 3.2.4) computed over a subset—2,501 communities, or approximately 25%—
of the data reserved for testing. As described in Section 3.2.2, training and testing data were
stratified on their labels to ensure that minority classes would appear in testing data.
However, it must be noted that several classes are underrepresented in the data; various
imbalance correction strategies were applied as explained in Section 3.2.3. Iterative model
development indicated that overall performance was highest with random oversampling.
However, this process was only applied to the training data to avoid an overly-optimistic
evaluation of model skill. Consequently, the support in the testing data reflects only real
communities for each class. For this reason, performance in categories with fewer true
samples is expected to be relatively lower. As seen in the “Support” column of Tables 4.2
and 4.6, this particularly affects the Inbound: AS and Inbound: Local Preference subclasses;
re-sampling the dataset has only allowed the model to predict these classes in novel data.
Therefore, our model is expected to be less generalizable with respect to these minority
subclasses of the standard taxonomy.
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4.2.1 MLP Metrics
The Binary Relevance method, described in Section 2.3.3, was used to create a model
with internal MLP estimators. This was the first model developed; it obtained approxi-
mately 78.65% aggregate accuracy on testing data with respect to eight subclasses of the
Bonaventure taxonomy presented in Section 2.2.1. Due to the limitations of the ground-truth
data from which community definitions were scraped (see Section 3.1.3), the subclasses of
Blackhole were not considered during the training phase. Thus, the model was trained to











Performance metrics, including precision, recall, and 1 score, were computed for each
class and are presented in Table 4.2; a complete confusion matrix is additionally presented
in Table 4.3. As described in Section 3.2.4, ROC and Precision-Recall curves were plotted
and are presented in Figure 4.3. The AUC for each class is noted in their respective legends.
Note that, for Precision-Recall curves, the AUC is computed as the average precision across
all thresholds.
Recall from Section 3.2.4 that ROC curves contrast the number of Type I errors (false
positives) of a model as it makes more positive predictions about class membership at
varying confidence thresholds. A theoretically-perfect ROC curve would pass through the
point (0, 1); such a model would be able to identify all true samples without a single false
positive in its predictions. Realistically, most models have a commensurate number of false
positives as the threshold for a positive prediction is lowered. An ROC curve thus always
increases monotonically. Precision-Recall curves are fundamentally similar, but contrast
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precision and recall instead of the true positive rate and the false positive rate. Recall from
Section 3.2.4 that recall measures the total fraction of true positives among all true samples,
and therefore will always be monotonically increasing as the threshold is lowered, whereas
precision is sensitive to the number of false positives in predictions at a given threshold.
Thus, it is not necessarily the case that it will decrease monotonically. Furthermore, it
should be noted that, since the number of thresholds is proportional to the number of unique
probability predictions made by the model, classes with fewer true samples in testing data
are tested at fewer thresholds.
For comparison, an additional MLP-based multi-class model was trained to classify the
three primary categories of the taxonomy, namely, Blackhole, Inbound, and Outbound
communities. The performance metrics and confusion matrix of this model are presented
in Tables 4.4 and 4.5, respectively; ROC and Precision-Recall curves for this model are
displayed in Figure 4.4. As expected, given the decreased complexity of this classification
problem, this model attained a higher overall accuracy of 93.84% on novel testing data.
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Table 4.2. This table presents the major performance metrics for the eight
subclasses fitted to the model during training. Performance is calculated over
a testing set of data. Support reflects the number of “true” samples of that
type in the testing data.
Class Precision Recall 1 Score Support
Blackhole 0.60 0.81 0.69 81
Inbound: AS 0.26 0.91 0.41 11
Inbound: Geographic 0.78 0.73 0.75 803
Inbound: IXP 0.90 0.76 0.82 1131
Inbound: Local Preference 0.38 0.82 0.52 22
Inbound: Type of Peer 0.76 0.95 0.85 213
Outbound: Announcement 0.56 0.85 0.67 78
Outbound: Prepending 0.73 0.97 0.83 162
Accuracy 0.79 2501
Macro Average 0.62 0.85 0.69 2501
Weighted Average 0.81 0.79 0.79 2501
Table 4.3. This table presents the confusion matrix for the MLP-based model
with respect to eight subclasses of the Bonaventure taxonomy. “Inbound” and
“Outbound” are omitted for the sake of brevity.
Predicted





Blackhole 66 1 4 6 1 0 3 0 81
AS 0 10 0 0 0 0 1 0 11
Geographic 24 13 585 89 16 27 26 23 803
IXP 16 13 152 862 7 32 17 32 1131
Local Preference 0 0 1 1 18 1 1 0 22
Type of Peer 1 1 2 1 2 203 1 2 213
Announcement 3 0 2 1 3 2 66 1 78
Prepending 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 157 162




Figure 4.3. ROC and Precision-Recall curves for the MLP-based model es-
timating eight subclasses of the Bonaventure taxonomy. Note that the “No
Skill” line represents a model incapable of predicting classes better than if it
were randomly guessing. Similarly, 1 score is the harmonic mean between
precision and recall: isocurves for varying 1 scores are plotted for reference.
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Table 4.4. This table presents the major performance metrics for the three
primary taxonomic classes fitted to the model during training. Performance
is calculated over a testing set of data. Support reflects the number of “true”
samples of that type in the testing data.
Class Precision Recall 1 Score Support
Blackhole 0.61 0.78 0.68 81
Inbound 0.99 0.94 0.96 2180
Outbound 0.72 0.97 0.82 240
Accuracy 0.94 2501
Macro Average 0.77 0.90 0.82 2501
Weighted Average 0.95 0.94 0.94 2501
Table 4.5. This table presents the confusion matrix for the MLP-based model
with respect to the three primary classes of the Bonaventure taxonomy.
Predicted




l Blackhole 63 17 1 81
Inbound 38 2052 90 2180
Outbound 2 6 232 240




Figure 4.4. ROC and Precision-Recall curves for the MLP-based model es-
timating the primary three classes of the Bonaventure taxonomy. Note that
the “No Skill” line represents a model incapable of predicting classes better
than if it were randomly guessing. Similarly, 1 score is the harmonic mean
between precision and recall: isocurves for varying 1 scores are plotted for
reference.
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As expected, the performance of this model varies with respect to the individual classes
of the community taxonomy. The most challenging classes for the MLP-based model were
Inbound: AS and Inbound: Local Preference with 1 scores of 0.41 and 0.52, respectively.
It is no coincidence that these classes are also those with the poorest representation in
data; support for these classes in testing data included only 33 “true samples” between
them. While this is likely the reason the model’s predictive accuracy suffered, it may also
suggest that their class boundaries are harder to estimate by such a model. If the engineered
feature set is insufficient for these classes, these classes will be more challenging to predict
effectively.
Similarly, Blackhole communities, even without exploring subclasses within the taxonomy,
suffered from the lowest 1 score of the primary three classes at 0.68, despite having
reasonably high support in testing data. This suggests that Blackholing is particularly
variable among AS semantic schemata. Future work may be able to achieve higher accuracy
with more extensive work in data collection and feature engineering.
Contrariwise, Inbound: Type of Peer, Inbound: IXP, and Outbound: Prepending all ex-
hibited 1 scores in excess of 0.80, which indicates that the model was able to more
effectively estimate their classification boundaries. This was expected particularly with re-
gard to prepending, which during the data collection and feature engineering phases was
observed to be more likely to share similar structure between ASes.
It must also be noted that the model’s recall was higher than its precision for all classes
save Inbound: Geographic. This indicates that the model often makes positive predictions
about class membership, and thus is more likely to identify true members, but is sometimes
incorrect in its assessment. This may suggest that some ASes structure their community
definitions such that certain community types exhibit features indicative of a different class
in another AS’s semantic schema.
For example, Level 3, AS number 3356, defines the community 3356:666 as an Inbound
tag for a route learned from a peer (i.e., it is an Inbound: Type of Peer community). This
is unusual because RFC 7999 defines a well-known Blackhole community, 65535:666;
the value 666 has thus been widely adopted among ASes for organizationally-defined
Blackhole communities [6], [39]. In fact, this model indeed misclassifies 3356:666 as a
Blackhole community. Since precision accounts for false positives, this Type I error will
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lower the precision for Inbound: Type of Peer communities. Recall, however, is unaffected;
it accounts only for true positives and false negatives (see Section 3.2.4).
Finally, the ROC and Precision-Recall curves present an interesting dichotomy in model
skill. Namely, the ROC curves indicate better performance than is observed in the Precision-
Recall curves: note, for example, that the AUC (or, equivalently, the average precision) of the
micro-average for all classes in the Precision-Recall curves in Figure 4.3b is 0.86, whereas
the micro-averaged AUROC in Figure 4.3a is 0.96. This is because ROC curves are plots
of the true positive rate versus the false positive rate at varying prediction thresholds; the
false positive rate incorporates true negatives, making changes in the ROC curve insensitive
to changes in class distributions. Thus, they may give an optimistic evaluation of model
skill for minority classes. This is why Precision-Recall curves were plotted for comparison:
they evaluate the fraction of true positives among positive predictions and thus offer a more
accurate evaluation of model skill with respect to imbalanced data [55], [56].
4.2.2 Random Forest Metrics
For comparison with MLPs as a classification algorithm, One-vs-All models utilizing inter-
nal Random Forests as estimators were also trained and tested on collected BGP community
data. This model was able to outperform the MLP-based model by a significant margin.
It attained 90.64% aggregate accuracy with respect to eight classes of the Bonaventure
taxonomy. Likewise, it was able to obtain 97.80% accuracy when trained to predict the
primary three classes of the Bonaventure taxonomy.
A complete set of performance metrics and a confusion matrix for this model are presented
in Tables 4.6 and 4.7, respectively; ROC and Precision-Recall curves are presented in Figure
4.5. Additionally, an evaluation of themodel’s performancewith respect to the three primary
classes of the Bonaventure taxonomy is presented in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 as well as Figure
4.6.
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Table 4.6. This table presents the major performance metrics for the eight
subclasses fitted to the model during training. Performance is calculated over
a testing set of data. Support reflects the number of “true” samples of that
type in the testing data.
Class Precision Recall 1 Score Support
Blackhole 0.76 0.72 0.74 81
Inbound: AS 0.75 0.55 0.63 11
Inbound: Geographic 0.88 0.88 0.88 803
Inbound: IXP 0.91 0.93 0.92 1131
Inbound: Local Preference 0.89 0.73 0.80 22
Inbound: Type of Peer 0.95 0.96 0.96 213
Outbound: Announcement 0.93 0.86 0.89 78
Outbound: Prepending 0.98 0.99 0.98 162
Accuracy 0.91 2501
Macro Average 0.88 0.83 0.85 2501
Weighted Average 0.91 0.91 0.91 2501
Table 4.7. This table presents the confusion matrix for the Random Forest-
based model with respect to eight subclasses of the Bonaventure taxonomy.
“Inbound” and “Outbound” are omitted for the sake of brevity.
Predicted





Blackhole 58 0 11 10 0 0 2 0 81
AS 0 6 2 2 0 1 0 0 11
Geographic 10 0 709 75 1 4 3 1 803
IXP 3 2 73 1047 1 4 0 1 1131
Local Preference 1 0 1 4 16 0 0 0 22
Type of Peer 2 0 3 3 0 204 0 1 213
Announcement 2 0 2 5 0 1 67 1 78
Prepending 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 160 162




Figure 4.5. ROC and Precision-Recall curves for the Random Forest-based
model estimating eight subclasses of the Bonaventure taxonomy. Note that
the “No Skill” line represents a model incapable of predicting classes better
than if it were randomly guessing. Similarly, 1 score is the harmonic mean
between precision and recall: isocurves for varying 1 scores are plotted for
reference.
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Table 4.8. This table presents the major performance metrics for the three
primary taxonomic classes fitted to the model during training. Performance
is calculated over a testing set of data. Support reflects the number of “true”
samples of that type in the testing data.
Class Precision Recall 1 Score Support
Blackhole 0.84 0.69 0.76 81
Inbound 0.98 0.99 0.99 2180
Outbound 0.98 0.93 0.96 240
Accuracy 0.98 2501
Macro Average 0.93 0.87 0.90 2501
Weighted Average 0.98 0.98 0.98 2501
Table 4.9. This table presents the confusion matrix for the Random Forest-
based model with respect to the three primary classes of the Bonaventure
taxonomy.
Predicted




l Blackhole 56 25 0 81
Inbound 9 2166 5 2180
Outbound 2 14 224 240




Figure 4.6. ROC and Precision-Recall curves for the Random Forest-based
model estimating the primary three classes of the Bonaventure taxonomy.
Note that the “No Skill” line represents a model incapable of predicting
classes better than if it were randomly guessing. Similarly, 1 score is the
harmonic mean between precision and recall: isocurves for varying 1 scores
are plotted for reference.
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The performance of the RandomForest-basedmodel is higher for every class; this difference
is particularly pronounced with respect to the eight subclasses of the Bonaventure taxonomy.
As with the MLP-based model, classes with relatively few true samples in the testing
data fared worse than classes with better support. As was observed with the previous
model, Inbound: AS had the worst 1 score among the eight subclasses (0.63); Blackhole
communities were similarly challenging for this model to classify correctly. Both of these
classes saw only mild increases in 1 score when compared to theMLP-based model. While
the lack of support is most likely the proximate cause for this difficulty with Inbound: AS
communities, the modest increase in predictive performance for Blackhole communities
lends further credence to the class’s likely variability between AS schemata. This is an
unexpected result.
An interesting trend observed with this model when contrasted with the MLP-based model
is that, unlike the latter, this model generally has higher precision than recall for each class.
Wherever this is not the case; e.g., for the Inbound: IXP class, precision and recall are
within a few hundredths of one another. This indicates that the Random-Forest model is
better overall than theMLPmodel; it oftenmakes positive predictions for members of a class
and is usually correct in its assessment. This is the desired behavior of any predictive model,
and thus the Random Forest-based model—trained on all collected community semantic
data—was selected for use in the subsequent section.
4.3 Taxonomic Distribution of Communities in Recent
BGP Data
Recent BGP data in MRT format were collected from three RIPE vantages in New York,
Amsterdam, and London. In total, 9.0 million communities were observed over 2.2 million
UPDATEs received on August 10, 2020, across all vantages studied. For comparison,
BGP data for the same three vantages were collected over a different capture interval;
an additional 7.7 million communities were collected on September 1, 2020. Table 4.10
displays the distribution of BGP control packet types observed between the two collection
intervals.
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Table 4.10. This table represents the types of control packet observed during
the two intervals studied; see Section 2.1.3 for more detail. Only UPDATE
packets were further analyzed.













As an immediate application of the best model—the Random Forest-based model—
predictions for the taxonomic description of each class were made on BGP communities
observed by parsing and extracting all community strings collected. For the capture in-
terval on August 10, 2020, 1,355,391 observed communities (15.09%) were present in
training data; however, many of the communities collected were repeated in subsequent
UPDATEs. In fact, only 10,425 unique communities (0.12% of the 9.0 million communities
collected) were observed at these vantages during the capture interval; only 950 (9.11%)
of these unique communities were present in training data. Similarly, of the communities
collected on September 1, 2020, 1,202,982 (15.59%) were present in training data. Only
10,409 (0.13% of the 7.7 million communities collected) of these communities were unique,
however. 963 (9.25%) of these unique communities were present in training data.
A conservative estimate for the taxonomic distribution of communities during both capture
intervals was made over the communities observed in training data; see Table 4.11 and
Figure 4.7 for both capture intervals. Ergo, this estimate accounts for 15.09% and 15.59%
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of communities seen onAugust 10, 2020, and September 1, 2020, respectively. Additionally,
an estimate for all communities observed over these periods—including the remaining, novel
inputs—is presented in Table 4.12 and Figure 4.8 using only the primary three categories
of the Bonaventure taxonomy for the most accurate possible result. Thus, this estimation
accounts for 100% of communities in both capture intervals, though is necessarily a less
confident result. Future work in expanding the pool of ground-truth predictions used as
inputs for training this model will increase its accuracy and generalizability with respect to
novel data, as new ground-truth training data will expand the model’s coverage of extant
semantic structure among ASes.
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Table 4.11. The best multi-class model developed predicted the following
taxonomic distribution of BGP communities in UPDATEs collected August
10, 2020, between 20:00 and 20:35 at various RIPE vantages. This distri-
bution is compared with UPDATEs collected at the same three vantages on
September 1, 2020, between 4:00 and 4:35. Note that the proportions shown
constitute only those communities which were present in training data, and
therefore those for which we have higher confidence in model skill. This
accounted for approximately 15% of all communities observed during both
capture intervals. Note that this also implies that this estimate is slightly
biased by the proportion of communities present in training data (see Table
3.1).






























(a) August 10, 2020 (b) September 1, 2020
Figure 4.7. These figures represent a conservative estimate for the taxo-
nomic distribution of communities observed in recent RIPE BGP data, as
predicted by the Random Forest-based model described in Section 4.2.2. In
this estimate, only communities which were present in training data were
considered, to afford the highest possible confidence. Therefore, these esti-
mates account for approximately 15% of all communities observed during
both capture intervals. Note that the scale for the y-axis is logarithmic.
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Table 4.12. The best multi-class model developed predicted the following
taxonomic distribution of BGP communities in UPDATEs collected August
10, 2020 between 20:00 and 20:35 at various RIPE vantages. This distribu-
tion is compared with UPDATEs collected at the same three vantages on
September 1, 2020 between 4:00 and 4:35. Note that, while this accounts
for 100% of communities collected across both capture intervals, the lack
of ground-truth data for as many as 85% of these communities necessarily
reduces our confidence in these predictions.












(a) August 10, 2020 (b) September 1, 2020
Figure 4.8. A complete accounting of the taxonomic distribution of all com-
munities observed in recent RIPE BGP data. This distribution was estimated
by the Random Forest-based model described in Section 4.2.2, and focuses
on the primary three subcategories of the Bonaventure taxonomy for the
most accurate result. This estimate is necessarily a less confident result,
given the inclusion of novel communities not seen during training and for
which ground-truth information may not be available.
This process estimated that the majority of the communities studied—in both applications
of the model—could be classified as Inbound communities, a fact which did not vary
significantly between capture intervals. In fact, the model predicted that the majority of
communities are Inbound: Geographic, Inbound: Type of Peer, and Inbound: IXP; together,
they accounted for between 96.2% and 97.9% of the communities for which we have
ground-truth data collected at these vantages. It should be noted that this result is slightly
biased by the proportion of communities present in ground-truth data, but the less-confident
estimate including all communities in Table 4.8 suggests that this distribution is largely
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accurate across the entirety of communities received during these periods. This was an
expected result; it corroborates the findings of Bonaventure et al. who were able to use
their community database to identify between 22.80% and 23.05% of communities in BGP
data across eight vantages, and found that the majority—55% on average—were Inbound
communities. However, as they were simply using a database of communities, they were
unable to obtain predictions on between 76.95% and 78.20% of the communities they
observed [8]. This suggests that the majority of communities transiting the control plane
have passive semantics.
By contrast, Outbound communities were predicted to comprise a small fraction of the
communities collected during both capture intervals. This is a somewhat surprising result,
and may be indicative of a period of general stability in the global routing tables with respect
to the short duration during which UPDATEs were studied at these specific vantages. It may
also suggest that Outbound communities are simply used more sparingly because they
have the potential to influence routing globally. Furthermore, it is possible that Inbound
communities are more likely to propagate improperly through the Internet, and thus are
over-represented in community strings. Interestingly, the predicted proportion of Blackhole
communities in ground-truth communities was much higher during the second capture
interval (increasing from 0.49% to 2.04%). It is unknown if this corresponds to a spike in
malicious DoS traffic during this period, or if the model is simply misclassifying Inbound
or Outbound communities, given its relatively lower 1 score for Blackhole communities as
described above. Besides this increase, the taxonomic distribution was very similar between
capture intervals. Additionally, our estimate for the remaining 85% of communities is
proportional during both capture intervals to the conservative estimate using only ground-
truth communities. However, our confidence in this result is necessarily lower, given the
lack of ground-truth labels for many of these communities.
Finally, it should be noted that well-known communities (see Table 2.2) accounted for
less than a tenth of a percent of the communities studied during both capture intervals
(approximately 0.01%). This appears to indicate that AS-defined communities see much
wider use given that they typically offer far greater granularity of signaling semantics,
though this result may be partially due to vantage-specific bias.
To complement this work, the length of community strings observed at each route collector
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was measured at these vantages during the two capture intervals. In total, 1,147,308 com-
munity strings were collected on August 10, 2020; 814,104 (36.48%) UPDATEs did not
utilize the optional community attribute. This information was summarized as a histogram
and a CDF in Figure 4.9. This analysis reveals approximately 85% of community strings
include ten or fewer communities. The average number of communities per string across
all vantages was approximately six communities. This analysis indicates that, for the time
interval under study, community string length remains relatively stable; UPDATEs with
more than ten communities in their community string appear only intermittently.
Interestingly, 6,819 (0.5%) of these community strings contained thirty or more commu-
nities. 585 (0.04%) extreme outliers with more than 50 communities were observed; of
these, the five UPDATEs with the longest string contained 386 communities. These extreme
values were omitted from Figure 4.9 to ensure its readability. It is unclear if these strings
are anomalous—i.e., the result of runaway propagation, misconfiguration, or malicious
intent—or if this behavior is intended.
To corroborate this result, 1,290,167 community strings were extracted fromBGP data at the
same vantages during the second capture interval on September 1, 2020; 810,967 (38.60%)
UPDATEs did not utilize the optional community attribute. This information is presented
in Figure 4.10. This analysis reveals very little variation from the previous capture interval;
the average number of communities per UPDATE was approximately 6 communities, and
the proportion of outliers is similar. For example, 669 community strings—0.05%—with
more than 50 communities were observed, although the longest of these contained only 173
communities in contrast with the prior capture interval.
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(a) Community String Lengths Over Time: August 10, 2020
(b) Community String Length: Histogram and CDF for August 10, 2020
Figure 4.9. The length of the BGP community string observed in UPDATEs
at three route collectors at RIPE was measured over time on August 10,
2020 between 20:00 and 20:35. For legibility, Figure 4.9a sampled the length
of one in every ten community strings.
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(a) Community String Lengths Over Time: September 1, 2020
(b) Community String Length: Histogram and CDF for September 1, 2020
Figure 4.10. To corroborate the results obtained in the prior capture interval,
the length of the BGP community string observed in UPDATEs at three route
collectors at RIPE was additionally measured on September 1, 2020 between
4:00 and 4:35. For legibility, Figure 4.10a sampled the length of one in every
ten community strings.
68
To further analyze variation in community string length and predicted semantics, stacked
area plots were created to illustrate the instantaneous distribution of community semantics
seen at each vantage as predicted by the best model; see Figures 4.11 and 4.12. To ensure
the highest confidence in these results, these predictions were restricted to ground-truth
communities present in training data.
This analysis suggests that themajority of UPDATEs at any givenmoment—at least for these
vantages, and during the two capture intervals—are location-encoding ingress communities,
and particularly Inbound: Geographic communities. Often, these strings appear to contain
Type of Peer communities as well, presumably to annotate economic relationships between
ASes as described in Section 2.1.6; according to the model, the NCC vantage appears to
collect more Inbound: Type of Peer communities than either of the other two vantages.
However, this may be due simply to the presence of these specific communities in collected
ground-truth data. Interestingly, the community strings observed at the NCC vantage during
September 1, 2020 (Figure 4.12c) appear to show brief spikes in Blackhole communities,
particularly at 4:03 and 4:23; this may be indicative of RTBH events. This correlates with the
increased proportion of Blackhole communities observed between the two capture intervals
in Table 4.11, and may be its proximate cause.
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(a) NYIIX (b) LINX and LONAP
(c) NCC
Figure 4.11. The instantaneous distribution of community semantics on Au-
gust 10, 2020 was analyzed for the period between 20:00 and 20:35 at three
RIPE vantages. For the greatest degree of accuracy, only communities for
which ground truth were available were considered during this period.
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(a) NYIIX (b) LINX and LONAP
(c) NCC
Figure 4.12. The instantaneous distribution of community semantics on
September 1, 2020 was analyzed for the period between 4:00 and 4:35 at
three RIPE vantages. For the greatest degree of accuracy, only communities
for which ground truth were available were considered during this period.
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This research sought to demystify the semantics of BGP communities using a machine
learning approach to classification of communities according to a unified taxonomy of
community services. To this end, ground-truth community definitions were collected using
web scraping and CAIDA’s Community Dictionary Dataset for use as training data for a
predictivemodel capable of classifying new communities. This research therefore serves as a
proof-of-concept for the application of machine learning methods to semantic classification
of BGP communities.
This thesis was motivated by a desire to identify the taxonomic distribution of communities,
allow AS operators and researchers to identify unknown communities as they transit the
control plane, and to inform future work in the creation of a community anomaly detection
system designed to detect and even combat community-based threats.
5.1 Major Findings and Implications for BGPCommunity
Semantics
During the data collection process, our research revealed that the Bonaventure taxonomy
does not fully account for all types of communities; approximately 0.25% of the 10,027
communities used in training and testing data could not be classified according to any
particular taxonomic subclass. One example of this is RTT communities such as are defined
by ECIX [47]. However, all communities in collected data can be classified by one of the
three primary taxonomic classes (Inbound, Outbound, or Blackhole).
Similarly, many BGP communities observed in ground-truth data also do not conform to
the standard syntax proposed by their foundational RFC; that is, the defining AS’s number
is not encoded in the most significant word in all 32-bit communities. 118 (1.18%) such
communities were collected, and there may be significantly more in ASes from which com-
munity data was not collected. Fundamentally, this appears to have arisen from a limitation
of the syntax whereby ASes were unable to encode sufficiently granular information in the
least significant word of a community. For example, the community 65402:nnn, as defined
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by AS 2914 (NTT), means to prepend its AS number twice to peer “nnn” in North America.
It would not be possible to encode both the active semantic and the peer’s AS number in
the least significant word while maintaining the standard RFC syntax.
Additionally, many Inbound communities are effectively multi-label with respect to the
unified taxonomy proposed by Bonaventure [8]. Among observed communities, this is
exclusive to Inbound communities used as route tags to encode passive information. 523
such communities (5.22%) were collected; the majority of these encoded both Type of Peer
and Geographic information about a particular route.
Finally, this research discovered that community definitions are not uniformly atomic.
In the schema used by at least one AS, AS 209, communities have different semantics
depending on the presence of other communities. For example, the community string
209:888 209:64520 209:64749 instructs AS 209 not to announce to any peers except
Deutsche Telekom, while 209:888 alone is simply a route tag indicating a type of peer
community [48]. This indicates that, at least in some cases, the entirety of the community
string must be analyzed to diagnose the correct signaling semantic in use.
These complexities were not fully captured by the models developed in Chapter 4, and
thus represent a limitation of our research. However, the majority of communities collected
(93.36%) are clearly differentiable according to the Bonaventure taxonomy and—to the best
of our knowledge—exhibit atomicity with respect to their signaling semantics.
Furthermore, our research demonstrates that an MLP-based One-vs-All model is able to
predict eight subclasses of the Bonaventure taxonomy with 78.65% aggregate accuracy
when presented with novel testing data, and is likewise capable of predicting the three
primary classes (Inbound, Outbound, and Blackhole) of the Bonaventure taxonomy with
93.84% accuracy. A Random Forest-based multi-class model attains even higher aggregate
accuracy: 90.64% accuracy when trained to recognize eight subclasses of the Bonaventure
taxonomy and 97.80% when trained on the the primary three classes.
An unexpected result of this model’s iterative development process is that Blackhole com-
munities, with an 1 score of 0.76 in the best model, are the most difficult of the primary
three classes for our model to effectively classify in novel data, even with relatively high
support in testing data. This suggests that Blackhole communities are the most variable (i.e.,
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have the fewest common features) between ASes. This must be considered when examining
the estimated taxonomic distribution presented in Figure 4.8. Table 4.9 demonstrates that
the majority of the model’s mispredictions for this class are, in fact, Inbound communities.
Using this model, we were able to estimate the taxonomic distribution of communities in
three vantages at RIPE during two separate capture intervals: between 20:00 and 20:35 on
August 10, 2020 and between 4:00 and 4:35 on September 1, 2020. Our model predicts that,
among communities seen during training (approximately 15% of all communities), the ma-
jority (between 96.71 and 98.43%) of communities collected over this interval were Inbound
communities. A much smaller fraction (between 1.08% and 1.24%) of these communities
were predicted to be Outbound communities; this may indicate that the intervals studied
were periods of relative stability in the global routing tables or that ASes are simply more
likely to use Outbound communities sparingly given the associated computational cost with
path convergence and exploration. An unexpectedly-high percentage (between 0.49% and
2.04%) of historical communities were classified as Blackhole communities. It is unclear
if this is due to a spike in Blackhole traffic (i.e., in response to a DoS attack(s)) during
the interval studied, or if the model is simply misclassifying Inbound communities given
its relatively lower 1 score with respect to Blackhole communities. This pattern appeared
to hold when the model was applied to the remaining 85% of communities observed at
each vantage, with between 94.94% and 94.98% of communities predicted to be Inbound
communities. However, this is necessarily a less confident result.
Additionally, the length of community strings over this interval was found to be relatively
stable. Among UPDATEs utilizing the optional community attribute, approximately 85%
of community strings seen during both capture intervals included ten or fewer communi-
ties. However, 1.13% of these community strings contained thirty or more communities;
between 0.04% and 0.05% of communities contained more than 50. The longest among
these contained as many as 386 communities.
To obtain further intuition over the instantaneous distribution of communities in the wild,
communities in recent BGP data were additionally fed to our model to create stacked area
plots measuring the proportion of community services seen at a given moment in time
for a vantage. This analysis suggests that the majority of communities seen at any given
moment at a vantage are used to tag ingress and the economic relationship between ASes.
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This is a logical result of the constraints of inter-domain routing with respect to economic
policy among ASes. Finally, spikes in predicted Blackholing communities during this time
may correspond to an RTBH event during one of our capture intervals; this may partially
explain the observed increase in the proportion of Blackholing communities between capture
intervals.
Unfortunately, this model cannot fully account for the usage of communities over this
time interval; in particular, it is unclear whether such spikes in community string length,
the instantaneous distribution of predicted community semantics, and other observations
represent anomalies or regular routing events. This is an essential question left for future
work.
5.2 Future Work
This thesis seeks to serve as a basis for future investigations into anomalous routing events,
particularly community-based threats. For example, identification of communities not in-
tended for a given AS may aid in the creation of an intelligent filter capable of offering
protection against unintended (or malicious) community-initiated consequences, such as
traffic blackholing. Such work should prioritize expanding the database of defined commu-
nities to improve the generalizability of our model and elucidate further structure—if such
structure indeed exists—in the community space amongASes fromwhich communities have
not yet been collected. This process may be aided by further work in web-scraping, and
perhaps even in natural language parsing. While our model is able to predict classifications
for communities defined by ASes from which definitions were not collected, additional
ground-truth data will help to improve accuracy, particularly in poorly-represented sub-
classes such as Inbound: AS, and perhaps reveal unexpected additional complications such
as are outlined in this chapter and in Section 3.1. These complexities should be addressed
in future research for the most accurate results.
Future work may also explore a performance analysis on a per-AS basis; that is, are there
some ASes which our model is able to classify with greater accuracy? Besides the vantages
studied in this thesis, future work may also explore whether taxonomic distribution of com-
munities is heavily influenced by the vantage at whichUPDATEs are collected. For example,
does the type of AS affect this distribution significantly? Does the time of day at a given AS
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affect it significantly? Do known anomalous events such as prefix hijacking affect it signif-
icantly? In general, future work should expand the application of this model to additional
vantages over multiple capture intervals. Finally, can we more strictly estimate prediction
confidence? That is, using estimation statistics, can we quantify the uncertainty for a given
prediction outcome, given the difficulties in understanding the underlying distribution of
community semantics?
Additionally, while extended and large communities have not yet seen the same level of
adoption as their 32-bit predecessors [15], future work may expand the scope of this work
to examine semantic structure and predictability to these communities. Given that extended
and large communities are becoming increasingly prevalent, this will likely be increasingly
important to understand the full implications of community usage generally, particularly
BGP anomalies which incorporate them.
Anomaly detection, however, is perhaps the most important subject for future work in this
area. The greatest challenge in regard to detection of anomalies is the lack of ground-truth
knowledge about community usage in the wild. This research can only partially answer
this question, insofar as it applies to community semantics and their distribution over time
as seen from a particular vantage. While some research has examined features by which
to classify these; e.g., longitudinal persistence and prevalence of communities in such
strings [57], discovering signatures for attacks and other anomalous behavior is a more
challenging problem.
Furthermore, detection of anomalies in community usage over time will require a model
architecture capable of responding to changes over time in multi-dimensional data. Future
work might involve collection of community strings over time from a specific vantage,
including semantic predictions and computations of metrics identified in related work, for
use as input to a model capable of classifying complex, multi-dimensional tensors.
One neural network architecture capable of extracting meaningful details from time-series
data is a Temporal Convolutional Network (TCN). This architecture applies temporal convo-
lution to an input tensor, such that the model learns to predict subsequent values in the time
series; the residuals between the predictor values and the real values in test data can then be
calculated and fitted to a multivariate Gaussian distribution. Prediction errors can be used as
an indicator for the probability of individual points in the time series being anomalous. Un-
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fortunately, while He et al. demonstrated that such amodel works well for anomaly detection
in time-series data with regular patterns, such as an Electrocardiogram (EKG) [58], it may
be the case that changes in the global routing table are too frequent and long-lasting for a
TCN to be effective alone in classifying changes in the community string. Furthermore, the
communities in use will necessarily reflect very vantage-specific factors, such as economic
relationships, geographic location for route ingress, etc. between ASes, and may change
over time as prefixes are withdrawn or first announced, further complicating the issue.
Thus, it will likely be necessary to build upon this architecture. For example, a TCN is
capable of acting as a feature extraction module in a Fully Convolutional Network (FCN).
In fact, Karim et al. demonstrated that an FCN augmented with an LSTM RNN can
achieve better than state-of-the-art performance in several applied time-series classification
problems. Suchmodels can learn temporal dependencies in sequences, andwith the addition
of an attention mechanism can learn such dependencies even over longer intervals [50]. We
offer this as a suggestion, though many architectural approaches are possible and should be
explored in future research for best results.
Building a full anomaly detection engine is a daunting task, but this research has demon-
strated that machine learning methods can be applied successfully to BGP community
semantics. Demystifying these semantics gives AS operators and researchers more tools to
understand community usage in their networks; moreover, prediction of community seman-
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